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Multidimensional auctions for long-term procurement contracts under the threat of early exit: the case of conservation auctions

Author

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  • Di Corato, Luca

    (Department of Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences)

  • Dosi, Cesare

    (Department of Economics and Management, University of Padova)

  • Moretto, Michele

    (Department of Economics and Management, University of Padova)

Abstract

In this paper we study how early-exit options, embedded in long-term procurement contracts which do not provide for sufficiently strong incentives against contract breach, can affect bidding behaviors in multidimensional procurement auctions and the parties' expected payoffs. We show first that bidders' payoff is lower when competing for contracts with unenforceable contract terms. Secondly, that neglecting the risk of opportunistic behavior by sellers can lead to contract awards that do not maximize the buyer's potential payoff. Finally, we make suggestions about how to mitigate potential misallocations, by pointing out the role of eligibility rules and competition among bidders.

Suggested Citation

  • Di Corato, Luca & Dosi, Cesare & Moretto, Michele, 2015. "Multidimensional auctions for long-term procurement contracts under the threat of early exit: the case of conservation auctions," Working Paper Series 2015:6, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Department Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:slueko:2015_006
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    Cited by:

    1. Marco Buso & Cesare Dosi & Michele Moretto, 2018. "Termination Fees and Contract Design in Public-Private Partnerships," Working Papers 2018.32, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    2. Ravi Kashyap, 2018. "Auction Theory Adaptations for Real Life Applications," Papers 1810.01736, arXiv.org, revised May 2019.
    3. Di Corato, Luca & Moretto, Michele, 2016. "Selling real assets: the impact of idiosyncratic project risk in an auction environment," Working Paper Series 2016:9, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Department Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public procurement; Scoring auctions; Contract breach; Real options; Conservation contracts;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • Q24 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Land
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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