The Gate is Open: Primary Care Physicians as Social Security Gatekeepers
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Kann, Inger Cathrine & Biørn, Erik & Lurås, Hilde, 2010. "Competition in general practice: Prescriptions to the elderly in a list patient system," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 751-764, September.
- Harald Dale-Olsen, 2014. "Sickness Absence, Sick Leave Pay, and Pay Schemes," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 28(1), pages 40-63, March.
- Markussen, Simen, 2009. "Closing the Gates? Evidence from a Natural Experiment on Physicians' Sickness Certification," Memorandum 19/2009, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Markussen, Simen, 2009. "The Effects of Sick-Leaves on Earnings," Memorandum 20/2009, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Gaute Torsvik & Kjell Vaage, 2014.
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- Torsvik, Gaute & Vaage, Kjell, 2014. "Gatekeeping versus monitoring: Evidence from a case with extended self-reporting of sickness absence," Working Papers in Economics 08/14, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
- Bryson, Alex & Dale-Olsen, Harald, 2017.
"Does Sick Pay Affect Workplace Absence?,"
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- Alex Bryson & Harald Dale-Olsen, 2017. "Does Sick Pay Affect Workplace Absence?," DoQSS Working Papers 17-12, Quantitative Social Science - UCL Social Research Institute, University College London.
- Markussen, Simen & Røed, Knut & Røgeberg, Ole J., 2013. "The Changing of the Guards: Can Physicians Contain Social Insurance Costs?," IZA Discussion Papers 7122, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Gøril Kvamme Løset & Harald Dale-Olsen & Tale Hellevik & Arne Mastekaasa & Tilmann von Soest & Kjersti Misje Østbakken, 2018. "Gender equality in sickness absence tolerance: Attitudes and norms of sickness absence are not different for men and women," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 13(8), pages 1-18, August.
- Markussen, Simen & Røed, Knut & Røgeberg, Ole, 2013. "The changing of the guards," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 1230-1239.
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More about this item
Keywords
Sicklisting; subjective diagnoses; asymmetric information; focus group interviews.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2009-09-11 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-HEA-2009-09-11 (Health Economics)
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