IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/kthrec/2014_007.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Mentoring the CEO or monitoring the ROI? The business angel's interrole conflict in the venture relationship

Author

Listed:
  • Fili, Andreas

    (Centre for Banking and Finance)

Abstract

n its normal context, a mentor is a trusted senior person who provides guidance and support to the protégé by keeping the best interest of the pro tégé in mind at all times. Earlier research has indicated that business angels are perceived as men tors by venture members, especially CEOs. An argument put forward in this paper is that an in vestor does not always have the protégé’s best interests in mind and, at times, prioritizes the re turn on investment instead. In some situations, this role conflict might become severe. If the busi ness angel continues in the mentor role, the protégé might take the venture on a very costly and risky course of action, whereas if the business angel switches to the investor role and simply veto es the idea of the CEO through the authority of being a major owner, the venture might be saved from the same costly adventures, but the protégé can be severely dismayed. Presumably, switc hing from the role of mentor to that of investor in this fashion would destroy the trust he ld by the protégé that the business angel really had the protégé’s best interests in mind, and would have repercussions on the relationship for a long time afterwards. This role conflict between being both an investor a nd a mentor is explored in the paper. Based on information gathered from semi-structured face-t o-face interviews with 9 business angels, an image emerges wherein the business angel remains in the mentoring role for as long as possible, given the perceived costs. The paper suggests that in order to understand what perceived costs mean for an investor, the concept of affordable los s (Sarasvathy, 2001) is of great use.One of the implications of affordable loss for an entrepreneur is envisioning the worst-case scenario and the money lost in that case (Dew, Sarasvathy, Read, & W iltbank, 2009). For a business angel, affordable loss could mean the same: the business a ngel could picture the cost of the worst-case scenario by studying the current course of action a nd decide whether it is affordable or not. As long as the worst-case cost associated with a certa in course of action is lower than the affordable loss, the business angel will continue to fulfill t he role of mentor in support of the venture chief executive officer (CEO). However, if the cost excee ds the affordable loss limit, the business angel will switch to the monitoring role, thereby prohibi ting this course of action.

Suggested Citation

  • Fili, Andreas, 2014. "Mentoring the CEO or monitoring the ROI? The business angel's interrole conflict in the venture relationship," Working Paper Series 14/7, Royal Institute of Technology, Department of Real Estate and Construction Management & Banking and Finance.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:kthrec:2014_007
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://kth.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:758324/FULLTEXT01.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cochrane, John H., 2005. "The risk and return of venture capital," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 3-52, January.
    2. Hellmann, Thomas & Puri, Manju, 2000. "The Interaction between Product Market and Financing Strategy: The Role of Venture Capital," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 13(4), pages 959-984.
    3. Sapienza, Harry J. & Manigart, Sophie & Vermeir, Wim, 1996. "Venture capitalist governance and value added in four countries," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 11(6), pages 439-469, November.
    4. Sonali K. Shah & Kevin G. Corley, 2006. "Building Better Theory by Bridging the Quantitative–Qualitative Divide," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(8), pages 1821-1835, December.
    5. Colin M. Mason & Richard T. Harrison, 2008. "Measuring business angel investment activity in the United Kingdom: a review of potential data sources," Venture Capital, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(4), pages 309-330, July.
    6. Jeffrey E. Sohl, 1999. "The early-stage equity market in the USA," Venture Capital, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 1(2), pages 101-120, April.
    7. Frances M Amatucci & Jeffrey E Sohl, 2004. "Women entrepreneurs securing business angel financing: tales from the field," Venture Capital, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(2-3), pages 181-196, April.
    8. Sullivan, Mary Kay & Miller, Alex, 1996. "Segmenting the informal venture capital market: Economic, hedonistic, and altruistic investors," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 25-35, May.
    9. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    10. Dew, Nicholas & Read, Stuart & Sarasvathy, Saras D. & Wiltbank, Robert, 2009. "Effectual versus predictive logics in entrepreneurial decision-making: Differences between experts and novices," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 287-309, July.
    11. repec:bla:jfinan:v:59:y:2004:i:4:p:1805-1844 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Dalal, Reeshad S. & Bonaccio, Silvia, 2010. "What types of advice do decision-makers prefer?," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 11-23, May.
    13. Malte Brettel, 2003. "Business angels in Germany: A research note," Venture Capital, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 5(3), pages 251-268.
    14. Laura Bottazzi & Marco Da Rin, 2002. "Venture capital in Europe and the financing of innovative companies [‘Robust financial contracting and the role of venture capitalists’]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 17(34), pages 229-270.
    15. Jonathan D. Arthurs & Lowell W. Busenitz, 2003. "The Boundaries and Limitations of Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory in the Venture Capitalist/Entrepreneur Relationship," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 28(2), pages 145-162, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lohwasser, Todor S., 2020. "Meta-analyzing the relative performance of venture capital-backed firms," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 4/2020, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.
    2. Rosenbusch, Nina & Brinckmann, Jan & Müller, Verena, 2013. "Does acquiring venture capital pay off for the funded firms? A meta-analysis on the relationship between venture capital investment and funded firm financial performance," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 335-353.
    3. Johannes Wallmeroth & Peter Wirtz & Alexander Peter Groh, 2017. "Institutional Seed Financing, Angel Financing, and Crowdfunding of Entrepreneurial Ventures: A Literature Review," Working Papers hal-01527999, HAL.
    4. Croce, Annalisa & Martí, José & Murtinu, Samuele, 2013. "The impact of venture capital on the productivity growth of European entrepreneurial firms: ‘Screening’ or ‘value added’ effect?," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 489-510.
    5. Stéphane Koffel & Jonathan Labbé, 2017. "Le financement des Capital-Investisseurs et Business Angels et l'effet sur l'innovation des entreprises," Post-Print hal-03556272, HAL.
    6. Alperovych, Yan & Hübner, Georges & Lobet, Fabrice, 2015. "How does governmental versus private venture capital backing affect a firm's efficiency? Evidence from Belgium," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 508-525.
    7. Jonathan Labbé, 2016. "Relationship between private and public investors: lever or hindrance to innovation [Relations entre investisseurs privés et publics : levier ou obstacle à l'innovation]," Post-Print hal-03000105, HAL.
    8. Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, 2011. "Venture Capital and Other Private Equity: a Survey," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 17(4), pages 619-654, September.
    9. Christof Beuselinck & Marc Deloof & Sophie Manigart, 2004. "Venture Capital, Private Equity and Earnings Quality," Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School Working Paper Series 2004-02, Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School.
    10. Christof Beuselinck & Marc Deloof & Sophie Manigart, 2008. "Private Equity Investments and Disclosure Policy," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(4), pages 607-639.
    11. Hall, Bronwyn H. & Lerner, Josh, 2010. "The Financing of R&D and Innovation," Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, in: Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 609-639, Elsevier.
    12. Dorothea Schäfer & Dirk Schilder, 2008. "Smart capital in German start-ups -- an empirical analysis," Venture Capital, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(2), pages 163-183, August.
    13. Ausra Gvazdaityte, 2012. "The analysis of the conditions needed for building venture capital industry in Lithuania," E3 Journal of Business Management and Economics., E3 Journals, vol. 3(3), pages 096-105.
    14. Stéphane Koffel & Jonathan Labbé, 2020. "Analyse comparée des financements par capital-investissement ou Business Angel : Un effet sur l'innovation ?," Post-Print hal-03161525, HAL.
    15. Pehr-Johan Norbäck & Lars Persson, 2009. "The Organization of the Innovation Industry: Entrepreneurs, Venture Capitalists, and Oligopolists," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(6), pages 1261-1290, December.
    16. Wen, Jun & Yang, Di & Feng, Gen-Fu & Dong, Minyi & Chang, Chun-Ping, 2018. "Venture capital and innovation in China: The non-linear evidence," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 148-162.
    17. Jia, Ning & Wang, Dan, 2017. "Skin in the game: General partner capital commitment, investment behavior and venture capital fund performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 110-130.
    18. Carpentier, Cécile & Suret, Jean-Marc, 2015. "Angel group members' decision process and rejection criteria: A longitudinal analysis," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 808-821.
    19. Alperovych, Yan & Hübner, Georges, 2011. "Explaining returns on venture capital backed companies: Evidence from Belgium," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 277-295, September.
    20. Jason Roderick Donaldson & Giorgia Piacentino & Anjan Thakor, 2021. "Intermediation Variety," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(6), pages 3103-3152, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    mentoring; business angels; role conflict; relationship; affordable loss;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:kthrec:2014_007. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Cecilia Hermansson (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ifkthse.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.