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Memory retrieval in the demand game with a few possible splits: Unfair conventions emerge in fair settings

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  • Bilancini, Ennio
  • Boncinelli, Leonardo
  • Vicario, Eugenio

Abstract

Our study examines the long-run evolutionary outcome emerging in scenarios where two populations engage in a demand game with three potential splits. These populations differ in the sample sizes used when best responding to retrieved information from the past. Our findings reveal the existence of a threshold in the setting's fairness (i.e., the fairness of unfair splits) such that, below the threshold (i.e., in an unfair setting), the emerging convention is the fair one, while above the threshold (i.e., in a fair setting), the emerging convention is unfair, favoring the agents with the longer sample size. The threshold gets lower as the difference in the sample sizes increases.

Suggested Citation

  • Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo & Vicario, Eugenio, 2024. "Memory retrieval in the demand game with a few possible splits: Unfair conventions emerge in fair settings," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 165(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:165:y:2024:i:c:s0165188924000915
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2024.104899
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bargain; Memory; Evolution; Stochastic stability; Convention;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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