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Strategic irrationality in extensive games

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  • Basu, Kaushik

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  • Basu, Kaushik, 1988. "Strategic irrationality in extensive games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 247-260, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:15:y:1988:i:3:p:247-260
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    1. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
    2. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
    3. McLennan, Andrew, 1985. "Justifiable Beliefs in Sequential Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 889-904, July.
    4. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-1028, July.
    5. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-1050, July.
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    1. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1999. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 165-185, December.
    2. Van Damme, Eric, 2002. "Strategic equilibrium," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 41, pages 1521-1596, Elsevier.
    3. Dufwenberg, Martin & Van Essen, Matt, 2018. "King of the Hill: Giving backward induction its best shot," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 125-138.
    4. Asheim, Geir B. & Brunnschweiler, Thomas, 2023. "Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 503-514.
    5. Basu, Kaushik, 2004. "Consumer Cognition and Pricing in the 9's in Oligopolistic Markets," Working Papers 04-04, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
    6. Dufwenberg, Martin & Kirchsteiger, Georg, 2019. "Modelling kindness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 228-234.
    7. Hatlebakk, Magnus, 2002. "A new and robust subgame perfect equilibrium in a model of triadic power relations," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 225-232, June.
    8. Jorn Rothe, 2000. "Uncertainty Aversion and Backward Induction," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1610, Econometric Society.
    9. Abhijit Banerjee & Jörgen W. Weibull & Ken Binmore, 1996. "Evolution and Rationality: Some Recent Game-Theoretic Results," International Economic Association Series, in: Beth Allen (ed.), Economics in a Changing World, chapter 4, pages 90-117, Palgrave Macmillan.
    10. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997. "On Rationalizability in Extensive Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 40-61, May.
    11. Geoffrey Dunbar & Juan Tu & Xiaoting Wang & Ruqu Wang, 2006. "Rationalizing Irrational Beliefs," Working Paper 1033, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    12. Antonio Quesada, 2002. "Belief system foundations of backward induction," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 393-403, December.
    13. Weibull, Jörgen W., 1992. "An Introduction to Evolutionary Game Theory," Working Paper Series 347, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    14. Marek Mikolaj Kaminski, 2019. "Generalized Backward Induction: Justification for a Folk Algorithm," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(3), pages 1-25, August.
    15. John Hillas & Elon Kohlberg, 1996. "Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9606002, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 18 Sep 1996.
    16. Barry O'Neill, 1992. "Deterrence Theory Discussion: II," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(4), pages 459-477, October.

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