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Solutions for the Stable Roommates Problem with Payments

Author

Listed:
  • Peter Biro

    (Institute of Economics Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies Hungarian Academy of Sciences)

  • Matthijs Bomhoff

    (Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Twente)

  • Walter Kern

    (Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Twente)

  • Petr A. Golovach

    (School of Engineering and Computing Sciences, Durham University, Science Laboratories)

  • Daniel Paulusma

    (School of Engineering and Computing Sciences, Durham University, Science Laboratories)

Abstract

The stable roommates problem with payments has as input a graph G(E,V) with an edge weighting w:E_ůR+ and the problem is to find a stable solution. A solution is a matching M with a vector p.RV that satisfies pu+pv=w(uv) for all uv.M and pu=0 for all u unmatched in M. A solution is stable if it prevents blocking pairs, i.e., pairs of adjacent vertices u and v with pu+pv

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Biro & Matthijs Bomhoff & Walter Kern & Petr A. Golovach & Daniel Paulusma, 2012. "Solutions for the Stable Roommates Problem with Payments," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1211, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:has:discpr:1211
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    File URL: http://econ.core.hu/file/download/mtdp/MTDP1211.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Johan Karlander & Kimmo Eriksson, 2001. "Stable outcomes of the roommate game with transferable utility," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(4), pages 555-569.
    2. Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2011. "On the number of blocks required to access the coalition structure core," MPRA Paper 29755, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Koczy, Laszlo A. & Lauwers, Luc, 2004. "The coalition structure core is accessible," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 86-93, July.
    4. Péter Biró & Walter Kern & Daniël Paulusma, 2012. "Computing solutions for matching games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(1), pages 75-90, February.
    5. Roth, Alvin E & Vande Vate, John H, 1990. "Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1475-1480, November.
    6. Diamantoudi, Effrosyni & Miyagawa, Eiichi & Xue, Licun, 2004. "Random paths to stability in the roommate problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 18-28, July.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Péter Biró & Gethin Norman, 2013. "Analysis of stochastic matching markets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(4), pages 1021-1040, November.
    2. Heinrich Nax & Bary Pradelski, 2015. "Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(4), pages 903-932, November.
    3. Bolle Friedel & Otto Philipp E., 2016. "Matching as a Stochastic Process," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 236(3), pages 323-348, May.
    4. Bary S. R. Pradelski & Heinrich H. Nax, 2020. "Market sentiments and convergence dynamics in decentralized assignment economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(1), pages 275-298, March.
    5. Newton, Jonathan & Sawa, Ryoji, 2015. "A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 1-27.
    6. Nax, Heinrich H. & Pradelski, Bary S. R., 2015. "Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 65428, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Satoru Fujishige & Zaifu Yang, 2015. "Decentralised Random Competitive Dynamic Market Processes," Discussion Papers 15/27, Department of Economics, University of York.
    8. Heinrich H. Nax & Bary S. R. Pradelski, 2016. "Core Stability and Core Selection in a Decentralized Labor Matching Market," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(2), pages 1-16, March.
    9. Chen, Bo & Fujishige, Satoru & Yang, Zaifu, 2016. "Random decentralized market processes for stable job matchings with competitive salaries," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 25-36.
    10. Bettina Klaus & Frédéric Payot, 2013. "Paths to Stability in the Assignment Problem," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 13.14, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    11. Bary S.R. Pradelski, 2014. "Evolutionary Dynamics and Fast Convergence in the Assignment Game," Economics Series Working Papers 700, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    12. Ahmet Alkan & Alparslan Tuncay, 2014. "Pairing Games and Markets," Working Papers 2014.48, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    roommates problem; matching game; cooperative game theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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