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American versus French labor and employment law : a critical review of the analysis of employment relationship in contract economic theories

Author

Listed:
  • Virgile Chassagnon

    (UGA [2016-2019] - Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019])

  • Bernard Baudry

    (TRIANGLE - Triangle : action, discours, pensée politique et économique - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - IEP Lyon - Sciences Po Lyon - Institut d'études politiques de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Despite the numerous economic works on the nature of the firm, only a few studies have clearly taken into account the legal and institutional contexts of the employer-employee relationship. This paper aims at comparing the regulation rules of the employment relationship advocated by contract economic theories to the American and French labor laws in both a positive and normative perspective. From a positive perspective, the contract approaches to the firm – transaction cost economics, the nexus of contracts theory and the modern theory of property rights – are similar to the tradition of American labor law. However, from a normative point of view, it appears that if contract economic theories seem to be partially in line with certain principles of the French labor law, there is a strong inconsistency between these approaches and the role that the French legal system gives to the State and to the law courts (and judges).

Suggested Citation

  • Virgile Chassagnon & Bernard Baudry, 2016. "American versus French labor and employment law : a critical review of the analysis of employment relationship in contract economic theories," Working Papers halshs-01371870, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01371870
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01371870
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Keywords

    Contract economic theories; employment relationship; American labor law; French labor law; contractual freedom; employers' powers; collective negotiation; disputes settlement;
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