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Endogenous preferences in games with type indeterminate players

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  • Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky

    (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

The Type Indeterminacy model is a theoretical framework that uses some elements of quantum formalism to model the constructive preference perspective suggested by Kahneman and Tversky. In this paper we extend the TI-model from simple to strategic decision-making and show that TI-games open a new field of strategic interaction. We first establish an equivalence result between static games of incomplete information and static TI-games. We next develop a new solution concept for non-commuting dynamic TI-games. The updating rule captures the novelty brought about by Type Indeterminacy namely that in addition to affecting information and payoffs, the action of a player impacts on the profile of types. We provide an example showing that TI-game predictions cannot be obtained as Bayes Nash equilibrium of the corresponding classical game.

Suggested Citation

  • Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2010. "Endogenous preferences in games with type indeterminate players," Working Papers halshs-00564895, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00564895
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00564895
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jérôme Busemeyer & Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2009. "An Exploration of Type Indeterminacy in Strategic Decision-making," Post-Print halshs-00754784, HAL.
    2. Danilov, V.I. & Lambert-Mogiliansky, A., 2008. "Measurable systems and behavioral sciences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 315-340, May.
    3. Pierfrancesco La Mura, 2003. "Correlated Equilibria of Classical Strategic Games with Quantum Signals," Papers quant-ph/0309033, arXiv.org.
    4. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, April.
    5. Jérôme Busemeyer & Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2009. "An Exploration of Type Indeterminacy in Strategic Decision-making," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754784, HAL.
    6. Geanakoplos, John & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1989. "Psychological games and sequential rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 60-79, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Jerome Busemeyer, 2012. "Quantum Type Indeterminacy in Dynamic Decision-Making: Self-Control through Identity Management," Games, MDPI, vol. 3(2), pages 1-22, May.
    2. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Ismael Martinez-Martinez, 2014. "Basic Framework for Games with Quantum-like Players," PSE Working Papers hal-01095472, HAL.
    3. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Ismael Martinez-Martinez, 2014. "Basic Framework for Games with Quantum-like Players," Working Papers hal-01095472, HAL.

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