An experimental study on learning about voting powers
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Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00501840
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- Gabriele Esposito & Eric Guerci & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Xiaoyan Lu & Naoki Watanabe, 2010. "An experimental study on learning about voting powers," Tsukuba Economics Working Papers 2010-005, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Tsukuba.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
experiment; learning; voting power; bargaining;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EXP-2010-07-24 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2010-07-24 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2010-07-24 (Positive Political Economics)
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