IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/wpaper/hal-04138872.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Why environmental regulation may lead to no-regret pollution abatement?

Author

Listed:
  • Thierry Bréchet
  • Pierre-André Jouvet

    (EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Empirical evidence support the existence of pollution abatement possibilities at negative costs, the so-called 'no-regret options'. We provide a microeconomic rationale for the existence of such potential at the firm's level under environmental regulation. An econometric application confirms that marginal pollution abatement cost curves with no-regret options are compatible with a standard production function, as stated in our theoretical model.

Suggested Citation

  • Thierry Bréchet & Pierre-André Jouvet, 2006. "Why environmental regulation may lead to no-regret pollution abatement?," Working Papers hal-04138872, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04138872
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04138872
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.science/hal-04138872/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Karen Palmer & Wallace E. Oates & Paul R. Portney & Karen Palmer & Wallace E. Oates & Paul R. Portney, 2004. "Tightening Environmental Standards: The Benefit-Cost or the No-Cost Paradigm?," Chapters, in: Environmental Policy and Fiscal Federalism, chapter 3, pages 53-66, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Jouvet, Pierre-Andre & Michel, Philippe & Rotillon, Gilles, 2005. "Optimal growth with pollution: how to use pollution permits?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 29(9), pages 1597-1609, September.
    3. Steven E. Stoft, 1995. "The Economics of Conserved-Energy "Supply" Curves," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 109-137.
    4. Ambec, Stefan & Barla, Philippe, 2005. "Can Environmental Regulations be Good for Business? an Assessment of the Porter Hypothesis," Cahiers de recherche 0505, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
    5. Adam B. Jaffe et al., 1995. "Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of U.S. Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 33(1), pages 132-163, March.
    6. Worcester, Dean A, Jr, 1969. "Pecuniary and Technological Externality, Factor Rents, and Social Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(5), pages 873-885, December.
    7. Isaksson, Lena Hoglund, 2005. "Abatement costs in response to the Swedish charge on nitrogen oxide emissions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 102-120, July.
    8. Stokey, Nancy L, 1998. "Are There Limits to Growth?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(1), pages 1-31, February.
    9. Barbera, Anthony J. & McConnell, Virginia D., 1990. "The impact of environmental regulations on industry productivity: Direct and indirect effects," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 50-65, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bréchet, Thierry & Jouvet, Pierre-André, 2009. "Why environmental management may yield no-regret pollution abatement options," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(6), pages 1770-1777, April.
    2. Stefan Ambec & Paul Lanoie, 2007. "When and Why Does It Pay To Be Green?," CIRANO Working Papers 2007s-20, CIRANO.
    3. Stefan Ambec & Mark A. Cohen & Stewart Elgie & Paul Lanoie, 2013. "The Porter Hypothesis at 20: Can Environmental Regulation Enhance Innovation and Competitiveness?," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 7(1), pages 2-22, January.
    4. Thierry Bréchet & Philippe Michel, 2007. "Environmental performance and equilibrium," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 40(4), pages 1078-1099, November.
    5. Everett, Tim & Ishwaran, Mallika & Ansaloni, Gian Paolo & Rubin, Alex, 2010. "Economic growth and the environment," MPRA Paper 23585, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Ambec, Stefan & Barla, Philippe, 2001. "Productivité et réglementation environnementale: une analyse de l'hypothèse de Porter," Cahiers de recherche 0107, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
    7. Dietrich Earnhart & Dylan G. Rassier, 2016. "“Effective regulatory stringency” and firms’ profitability: the effects of effluent limits and government monitoring," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 111-145, October.
    8. Xiguang Cao & Min Deng & Fei Song & Shihu Zhong & Junhao Zhu, 2019. "Direct and moderating effects of environmental regulation intensity on enterprise technological innovation: The case of China," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 14(10), pages 1-20, October.
    9. Philippe Barla & Christos Constantatos & Markus Herrmann, 2008. "Environmental Regulation as a Coordination Device for the Introduction of a Green Product: The Porter’s Hypothesis Revisited," Discussion Paper Series 2008_04, Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, revised May 2008.
    10. Bu, Maoliang & Qiao, Zhenzi & Liu, Beibei, 2020. "Voluntary environmental regulation and firm innovation in China," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 10-18.
    11. Marcus Wagner & Nguyen Van Phu & Théophile Azomahou & Walter Wehrmeyer, 2002. "The relationship between the environmental and economic performance of firms: an empirical analysis of the European paper industry," Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 9(3), pages 133-146, September.
    12. Hamamoto, Mitsutsugu, 2006. "Environmental regulation and the productivity of Japanese manufacturing industries," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 299-312, November.
    13. Xiang Deng & Li Li, 2020. "Promoting or Inhibiting? The Impact of Environmental Regulation on Corporate Financial Performance—An Empirical Analysis Based on China," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 17(11), pages 1-17, May.
    14. Kenneth Rødseth, 2014. "Efficiency measurement when producers control pollutants: a non-parametric approach," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 211-223, October.
    15. Doran, Justin & Ryan, Geraldine, 2012. "Regulation and Firm Perception, Eco-Innovation and Firm Performance," MPRA Paper 44578, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Hitchens, David M. W. N., 1999. "The implications for competitiveness of environmental regulations for peripheral regions in the E.U," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 101-114, February.
    17. Ambec, Stefan & Barla, Philippe, 2005. "Quand la réglementation environmentale profite aux polleurs. Survol des fondements théoriques de l'hypothèse de Porter," Cahiers de recherche 0504, GREEN.
    18. Brännlund, Runar & Lundgren, Tommy, 2008. "Environmental policy and profitability - Evidence from Swedish industry," Umeå Economic Studies 750, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    19. Paul Lanoie & Jérémy Laurent‐Lucchetti & Nick Johnstone & Stefan Ambec, 2011. "Environmental Policy, Innovation and Performance: New Insights on the Porter Hypothesis," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 803-842, September.
    20. Ambec, Stefan & Barla, Philippe, 2005. "Can Environmental Regulations be Good for Business? an Assessment of the Porter Hypothesis," Cahiers de recherche 0505, Université Laval - Département d'économique.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    No-regret options; pollution; regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
    • Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04138872. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.