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Matching In Closed Forms

Author

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  • Ulysse Lawogni

    (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CY - CY Cergy Paris Université)

Abstract

In this paper, we consider an equally weighted bipartite matching market with transferability of the utility. We analyze the equilibrium of the market in the case of nearly full matching and in the case of nearly scarce matching. Considering a particular case of full matching with a quadratic specification and Gaussian distributions of the characteristics, we find entirely the analytical expression the optimal matching and of the individual surpluses gained by the partners from the sharing of the joint surplus at the equilibrium. We provide two ways to estimate the model.

Suggested Citation

  • Ulysse Lawogni, 2021. "Matching In Closed Forms," Working Papers hal-03446716, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03446716
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03446716
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Arnaud Dupuy & Alfred Galichon, 2014. "Personality Traits and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 122(6), pages 1271-1319.
    2. Arnaud Dupuy & Alfred Galichon, 2014. "Personality traits and the marriage market," Post-Print hal-03470458, HAL.
    3. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5rkqqmvrn4tl22s9mc0c7apsi is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Eugene Choo & Aloysius Siow, 2006. "Who Marries Whom and Why," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(1), pages 175-201, February.
    5. Ilse Lindenlaub, 2017. "Sorting Multidimensional Types: Theory and Application," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(2), pages 718-789.
    6. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/361levbcs399s9oa154em6h9jl is not listed on IDEAS
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