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L'expérimentation du revenu de solidarité active entre objectifs scientifiques et politiques

Author

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  • Guillaume Allegre

    (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

Abstract

L'expérimentation du revenu de solidarité active conduite dans 34 départements volontaires sur une période allant de novembre 2007 à juin 2009 est sans doute la plus importante expérimentation sociale menée jusqu'à ce jour en France. Le RSA tel qu'il a été généralisé poursuit un double objectif : combattre la pauvreté des travailleurs à bas salaires et créer un écart entre revenus d'activité et minima sociaux afin d'inciter à l'emploi. L'instrument consiste à remplacer les minima sociaux (RMI, API) et leur système d'intéressement par une prestation dégressive qui, contrairement au système antérieur d'aide aux bas salaires, est pérenne et familialisée. Les questions empiriques concernant ce type d'instrument sont nombreuses et peuvent justifier l'approche expérimentale. Malheureusement, l'expérimentation a finalement apporté relativement peu d'enseignements sur l'efficacité d'un tel mécanisme. La durée de l'expérimentation n'a pas permis de comparer le caractère pérenne du dispositif par rapport aux dispositifs transitoires en place dans les territoires de contrôle. L'éligibilité restreinte au RSA expérimental par rapport au dispositif généralisé n'a pas permis d'évaluer les effets potentiellement négatifs de la familialisation sur l'incitation à l'emploi. Nous montrons que le protocole mis en place n'a pas permis de résoudre les difficultés méthodologiques posées par l'expérimentation des incitations financières. La puissance statistique de l'expérimentation est faible, les biais liés aux effets de mobilisation ont été négligés et le contexte économique particulièrement défavorable est peu propice aux généralisations. En conclusion, nous émettons l'hypothèse que l'échec relatif de l'expérimentation s'explique en partie par l'hétérogénéité des objectifs poursuivis par les acteurs, scientifiques et politiques, qui l'ont mise en place.

Suggested Citation

  • Guillaume Allegre, 2009. "L'expérimentation du revenu de solidarité active entre objectifs scientifiques et politiques," Working Papers hal-01069372, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01069372
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-01069372
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Expérimentation; RSA; Minima sociaux; Incitations à l'emploi; Travailleurs pauvres;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J08 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics Policies
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments

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