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Two-player Games: a Reduction

Author

Listed:
  • Nicolas Vieille

    (GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

The general idea of the proof is to define a class of sets, the solvable sets, which can safely be thought of as absorbing states.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Vieille, 2001. "Two-player Games: a Reduction," Working Papers hal-00595479, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00595479
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mertens, Jean-Francois, 2002. "Stochastic games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 47, pages 1809-1832, Elsevier.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    stochastic games; recursive games;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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