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Mean-field approximation of stochastic population processes in games

Author

Listed:
  • Michel Benaïm

    (UNINE - Institut de Mathématiques - UNINE - Université de Neuchâtel = University of Neuchatel)

  • Jörgen Weibull

    (SSE - Department of Economics - SSE - Stockholm School of Economics, X-DEP-ECO - Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris)

Abstract

We here establish an upper bound on the probability for deviations of a Markov population process from its mean-field approximation.

Suggested Citation

  • Michel Benaïm & Jörgen Weibull, 2009. "Mean-field approximation of stochastic population processes in games," Working Papers hal-00435515, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00435515
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00435515
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens A., 2008. "Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 229-245, May.
    2. Michel BenaÔm & J–rgen W. Weibull, 2003. "Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 873-903, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. López-Pintado, Dunia & Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A., 2021. "Far above others," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
      • Dunia López-Pintado & Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez, 2018. "Far above others," Working Papers 18.12, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.

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