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Random matching in adaptive dynamics

Author

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  • Glenn Ellison
  • Drew Fudenberg
  • Lorens A. Imhof

Abstract

This paper studies the effect of randomness in per-period matching on the long-run outcome of non-equilibrium adaptive processes. If there are many matchings between each strategy revision, the randomness due to matching will be small; our question is when a very small noise due to matching has a negligible effect. We study two different senses of this idea, and provide sufficient conditions for each. The less demanding sense corresponds to sending the matching noise to zero while holding fixed all other aspects of the adaptive process. The second sense in which matching noise can be negligible is that it does not alter the limit distribution obtained as the limit of the invariant distributions as an exogenous "mutation rate" goes to zero.
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Suggested Citation

  • Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg & Lorens A. Imhof, 2007. "Random matching in adaptive dynamics," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000815, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000815
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    File URL: http://econweb.fas.harvard.edu/hier/2006papers/HIER2126.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Glenn Ellison, 2000. "Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(1), pages 17-45.
    2. Robson, Arthur J. & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 1996. "Efficient Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Random Matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 65-92, July.
    3. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    4. Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens A., 2008. "Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 229-245, May.
    5. Ellison, Glenn, 1997. "Learning from Personal Experience: One Rational Guy and the Justification of Myopia," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 180-210, May.
    6. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    7. Bergin, James & Lipman, Barton L, 1996. "Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(4), pages 943-956, July.
    8. Vega-Redondo, Fernando (ed.), 1996. "Evolution, Games, and Economic Behaviour," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198774723.
    9. Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens A., 2006. "Imitation processes with small mutations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 251-262, November.
    10. Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry, 1997. "Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 235-265, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Block, Juan I. & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2019. "Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(1), January.
    2. Fudenberg, Drew & Takahashi, Satoru, 2011. "Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 100-120, January.
    3. , & , H. & ,, 2015. "Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
    4. Juan I Block & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2017. "Learning Dynamics Based on Social Comparisons," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001375, David K. Levine.
    5. Robert Molzon, 2012. "Large Population Limits for Evolutionary Dynamics with Random Matching," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 146-159, March.

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