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Judge: Don't Vote !

Author

Listed:
  • Michel Balinski

    (Centre national de la recherché scientifique, Laboratoire d'Econométrie, Ecole Polytechnique, 91128 Palaiseau Cedex, France)

  • Rida Laraki

    (Centre national de la recherché scientifique, Laboratoire d'Analyse et modelisation de Systemes pour l'Aide a la DEcision, Université Paris-Dauphine, 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France; and Département d'Economie, Ecole Polytechnique, 91128 Palaiseau Cedex, France)

Abstract

This article argues that the traditional model of the theory of social choice is not a good model and does not lead to acceptable methods of ranking and electing. It presents a more meaningful and realistic model that leads naturally to a method of ranking and electing--- majority judgment ---that better meets the traditional criteria of what constitutes a good method. It gives descriptions of its successful use in several different practical situations and compares it with other methods including Condorcet's, Borda's, first-past-the-post, and approval voting.

Suggested Citation

  • Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2014. "Judge: Don't Vote !," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 62(3), pages 483-511, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:oropre:v:62:y:2014:i:3:p:483-511
    DOI: 10.1287/opre.2014.1269
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2011. "Election by Majority Judgment: Experimental Evidence," Studies in Public Choice, in: Bernard Dolez & Bernard Grofman & Annie Laurent (ed.), In Situ and Laboratory Experiments on Electoral Law Reform, chapter 0, pages 13-54, Springer.
    2. Vincent R. Merlin & Donald G. Saari, "undated". "The Copeland Method I; Relationships and the Dictionary," Discussion Papers 1111, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. Hammond, Peter J, 1976. "Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(4), pages 793-804, July.
    4. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
    5. Young, H. P., 1988. "Condorcet's Theory of Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(4), pages 1231-1244, December.
    6. Claude D'Aspremont & Louis Gevers, 1977. "Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 44(2), pages 199-209.
    7. Muller, Eitan & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1977. "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 412-418, April.
    8. Balinski, Michel & Jennings, Andrew & Laraki, Rida, 2009. "Monotonic incompatibility between electing and ranking," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 145-147, November.
    9. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    10. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    11. Donald G. Saari & Vincent R. Merlin, 1996. "The Copeland method (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(1), pages 51-76.
    12. Eric Zitzewitz, 2006. "Nationalism in Winter Sports Judging and Its Lessons for Organizational Decision Making," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 67-99, March.
    13. Michel L. Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2006. "A Theory of Measuring, Electing and Ranking," Working Papers hal-00243040, HAL.
    14. Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 2008. "On The Robustness of Majority Rule," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 949-973, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Laruelle, Annick, 2018. "Voting and expressing dissatisfaction: an experiment during the 2017 French Presidential election," IKERLANAK 25736, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    2. Bayindir, Esra Eren & Gurdal, Mehmet Yigit & Saglam, Ismail, 2019. "A Game Theoretic Approach to Peer Review of Grant Proposals," Journal of Informetrics, Elsevier, vol. 13(4).
    3. Pajala, Tommi & Korhonen, Pekka & Malo, Pekka & Sinha, Ankur & Wallenius, Jyrki & Dehnokhalaji, Akram, 2018. "Accounting for political opinions, power, and influence: A Voting Advice Application," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 266(2), pages 702-715.
    4. Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2020. "Majority judgment vs. majority rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(2), pages 429-461, March.
    5. António Osório, 2017. "Judgement and ranking: living with hidden bias," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 253(1), pages 501-518, June.
    6. Stefano Vannucci, 2019. "Majority judgment and strategy-proofness: a characterization," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(3), pages 863-886, September.

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