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Stable Allocation Mechanism

Author

Listed:
  • Mourad Baïou

    (CECO - Laboratoire d'économétrie de l'École polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Michel L. Balinski

    (CECO - Laboratoire d'économétrie de l'École polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

The stable allocation problem is the generalization of the well-known and much studied stable (0,1)-matching problems to the allocation of real numbers (hours or quantities). There are two distinct sets of agents, a set I of "employees" or "buyers" and a set J of "employers" or "sellers", each agent with preferences over the opposite set and each with a given available time or quantity. In common with its specializations, and allocation problem may have exponentially many stable solutions (though in the "generic" case it has exactly one stable allocation). A mechanism is a function that selects exactly one stable allocation for any problem. The "employee-optimal" mechanism XI that always selects xI, the "employee-optimal" stable allocation, is characterized as the unique one that is, for employees, either "efficient", or "monotone", or "strategy-proof."

Suggested Citation

  • Mourad Baïou & Michel L. Balinski, 2002. "Stable Allocation Mechanism," Working Papers hal-00243002, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00243002
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00243002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992. "Two-sided matching," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541, Elsevier.
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