Strategic Formation of Coalitions
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- Jinpeng Ma, 1998. "Strategic Formation of Coalitions," Departmental Working Papers 199810, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Ehlers, Lars, 2018.
"Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 393-407.
- EHLERS, Lars, 2014. "Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited," Cahiers de recherche 2014-02, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Lars EHLERS, 2014. "Strategy-Proofness and Essentially Single-Valued Cores Revisited," Cahiers de recherche 05-2014, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
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JEL classification:
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
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