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Weighted Majoritarian Rules for the Location of Multiple Public Facilities

Author

Listed:
  • Olivier Bochet

    (UNIBE - Universität Bern = University of Bern = Université de Berne)

  • Sidartha Gordon

    (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • René Saran

    (Yale University [New Haven])

Abstract

We consider collective decision problems given by a profile of single-peakedpreferences defined over the real line and a set of pure public facilities to be located on the line. In this context, Bochet and Gordon (2012) provide a large class of priority rules based on efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each such rule is described by a fixed priority ordering among interest groups. We show that any priority rule which treats agents symmetrically - anonymity - , respects some form of coherence across collective decision problems - reinforcement - and only depends on peak information - peak-only -, is a weighted majoritarian rule. Each such rule defines priorities based on the relative size of the interest groups and specific weights attached to locations. We give an explicit account of the richness of this class of rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Bochet & Sidartha Gordon & René Saran, 2013. "Weighted Majoritarian Rules for the Location of Multiple Public Facilities," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03460749, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03460749
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03460749
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bochet, Olivier & Gordon, Sidartha, 2012. "Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 52-67.
    2. Toyotaka Sakai & Takuma Wakayama, 2012. "Strategy-proofness, tops-only, and the uniform rule," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(3), pages 287-301, March.
    3. Olivier Bochet & Sidartha Gordon, 2012. "Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities," Post-Print hal-03417535, HAL.
    4. Ehlers, Lars, 2002. "Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 1-15, February.
    5. Olivier Bochet & Sidartha Gordon, 2012. "Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities," Post-Print hal-03417534, HAL.
    6. Masashi Umezawa, 2012. "The replacement principle for the provision of multiple public goods on tree networks," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(2), pages 211-235, February.
    7. Eiichi Miyagawa, 2001. "Locating libraries on a street," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(3), pages 527-541.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multiple Public Facilities; Priority Rules; Weighted Majori- tarian Rules; Object-Population Monotonicity; Sovereignty; Reinforcement; Anonymity.;
    All these keywords.

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