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Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities

Author

Listed:
  • Olivier Bochet

    (UNIBE - Universität Bern = University of Bern = Université de Berne)

  • Sidartha Gordon

Abstract

A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not suffer from congestion and are non-excludable. We characterize the class of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule in the class is a priority rule that selects locations according to a predetermined priority ordering among "interest groups". We characterize the subclasses of priority rules that respectively satisfy anonymity, avoid the no-show paradox, strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity. In particular, we prove that a priority rule is strategy-proof if and only if it partitions the set of agents into a fixed hierarchy. Any such rule can also be viewed as a collection of generalized peak-selection median rules, that are linked across populations, in a way that we describe.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Bochet & Sidartha Gordon, 2012. "Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities," Post-Print hal-03417535, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03417535
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Chatterji, Shurojit & Roy, Souvik & Sadhukhan, Soumyarup & Sen, Arunava & Zeng, Huaxia, 2022. "Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    2. Ingalagavi, Chinmay & Sadhukhan, Soumyarup, 2023. "On a class of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with single-peaked utility functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    3. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/6ggbvnr6munghes9oc5kng5b4 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/6ggbvnr6munghes9oc5kng5b4 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Olivier Bochet & Sidartha Gordon & René Saran, 2013. "Weighted Majoritarian Rules for the Location of Multiple Public Facilities," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03460749, HAL.
    6. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/6ggbvnr6munghes9oc5kng5b4 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Gogulapati Sreedurga & Soumyarup Sadhukhan & Souvik Roy & Yadati Narahari, 2022. "Characterization of Group-Fair Social Choice Rules under Single-Peaked Preferences," Papers 2207.07984, arXiv.org.
    8. Bochet, Olivier & Gordon, Sidartha & Saran, Rene, 2013. "Weighted majoritarian rules for the location of multiple public facilities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 454-459.
    9. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/6ggbvnr6munghes9oc5kng5b4 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Chatterji, Shurojit & Zeng, Huaxia, 2019. "Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 25-105.
    11. Shurojit Chatterji & Souvik Roy & Soumyarup Sadhukhan & Arunava Sen & Huaxia Zeng, 2021. "Probabilistic Fixed Ballot Rules and Hybrid Domains," Papers 2105.10677, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
    12. Eun Heo, 2013. "Strategy-proof rules for two public goods: double median rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(4), pages 895-922, October.
    13. Olivier Bochet & Sidartha Gordon & René Saran, 2013. "Weighted Majoritarian Rules for the Location of Multiple Public Facilities," Working Papers hal-03460749, HAL.

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