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Pour une régulation économique des contrats courts sans contraindre les entreprises, en préservant l'assurance

Author

Listed:
  • Bruno Coquet

    (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

  • Eric Heyer

    (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

Abstract

Les contrats de travail de courte durée sont un instrument aussi ordinaire qu'indispensabledansuneéconomiedemarché.Ilscontribuentàaccroîtrela productionpotentielle,etdoncl'emploi1 :silesemployeursavaientl'obligation deneconclurequedescontratsàla foislongsetdifficilesà rompre,certains projetsneverraientpaslejour. Eneffet, toutplandeproductioncomporteunepartirréductible d'incertitude quant au succès des produits ou services, qui détermine la rentabilité des investissements.L'entrepreneurdoitparconséquentêtreprudent enréduisant tous lesrisquesqu'ilpeutcontrôler. Laconjonctureéconomiqueestunesourced'incertitude,etelleinfluence aussi le choix des contrats de travail, d'autant plus que l'offre de travail est abondante.Le salariéestdansune situationsymétrique,cherchantd'abordà travailler,puisàobteniruncontratde travailstableafinde réduiresa propre incertitude, et enfin à maximisersa rémunération. Les taux d'activité et de chômage sont donc déterminants pour apprécier qui de l'employeur ou du salarié est en situation de choisir le type de contrat de travail. Même si l'employeurchoisitleplussouvent,ilestaussidessalariés qui, n'ayant pasde difficultéàtrouverl'emploiqu'ils souhaitent,préfèrent descontratscourts2 ,en raison de leur flexibilité plus grande, ou de la rémunération plus élevée en termes de salaire ou de revenu total, une fois inclu

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno Coquet & Eric Heyer, 2018. "Pour une régulation économique des contrats courts sans contraindre les entreprises, en préservant l'assurance," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03404222, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03404222
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03404222
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cahuc, Pierre & Postel-Vinay, Fabien, 2002. "Temporary jobs, employment protection and labor market performance," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 63-91, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bruno Coquet, 2022. "Les deux réformes de l'assurance chômage," Working Papers hal-04254941, HAL.
    2. Bruno Coquet, 2022. "Les deux réformes de l'assurance chômage," Post-Print hal-03615525, HAL.

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    Keywords

    Emploi; Contrats;

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