The Pearl of the Empire? Private Capital and Concession Rubber in Indochina, 1910-1945

In this paper, we provide an estimate of "colonial returns" in the French Empire, using a case study on Indochinese rubber plantations between 1910 and 1945. While French colonial capitalism is often distinguished from British and Dutch cases as purely mercantilist and speculative, we show that capital investments and profits were sustained and long-lasting for a number of firms in this context. Relying on an exhaustive list of listed and non-listed companies, along with capital stock, equity prices, surfaces, tonnage, and labor usage, we explain how rubber became, in less than three decades, the colony's primary crop in export value. In doing so, this paper makes three contributions to the economic history of late colonialism. First, we provide a comparison to recent studies of "colonial returns" in South East Asia: as a late-comer to the industry, Indochina benefited from innovations implemented elsewhere, and remained insulated from global limitations on production during the 1920s and 1930s, along with a rise in the global demand. Second, we show that the main driver of capital flows was a new iteration of the concession regime -the mise en valeur -, which provided firms a lenient access to land and unfree, contract labor in exchange for strict equity and cultivation clauses. As a result, Indochinese plantations had much larger surfaces than elsewhere and a more limited share of smallholder production, but also experienced less speculation than in other parts of the Empire. Third, we show that much of the gains happened after 1935, following a massive support from the French government during the Great Depression and a shift of exports from France to the U.S. These gains persisted well into the war, following a wave of concentration at the benefit of a small number of firms; pointing to the long, postcolonial legacies of colonial capital.