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Rappel de la loi républicaine sur la concurrence pour Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon : Une nouvelle volonté politique pour les économies ultramarines

Author

Listed:
  • Florent Venayre

    (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - UPVM - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier, GDI - Gouvernance et développement insulaire - UPF - Université de la Polynésie Française)

Abstract

Since 2009 the French competition policy has been experiencing a major turning point. Long held out of the principles of competition, French overseas territories are now the subject of a particularly important activity of the Competition Authority, supported by a new political will. The recent sanction of a cartel on the tiny territory of Saint Pierre and Miquelon fits in this desire to show that no French territory can overcome republican laws. However, this new ambition still does not concern large French territories in the Pacific Ocean (New Caledonia and French Polynesia) because of their high degree of autonomy.

Suggested Citation

  • Florent Venayre, 2013. "Rappel de la loi républicaine sur la concurrence pour Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon : Une nouvelle volonté politique pour les économies ultramarines," Post-Print halshs-00865120, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00865120
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00865120
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Florent Venayre, 2011. "La détermination des sanctions dans les ententes sur appels d'offres en l'absence de contestation des griefs," Post-Print halshs-00645275, HAL.
    2. Motta, Massimo & Polo, Michele, 2003. "Leniency programs and cartel prosecution," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 347-379, March.
    3. Florent Venayre & Christian Montet, 2013. "La concurrence à Tahiti : Une utopie ?," Post-Print halshs-00918171, HAL.
    4. repec:dau:papers:123456789/13637 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2002. "What Determines Cartel Success?," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2002-01, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
    6. Florent Venayre, 2012. ""Nous, au village, aussi, l'on a, De beaux assassinats"... Ou l'entente saint-pierraise et ses enseignements en matière de sanctions et de non-contestation des griefs," Post-Print halshs-00739141, HAL.
    7. Christian Montet & Florent Venayre, 2012. "Politique de la concurrence dans les petits pays insulaires : Le rapport pour le Forum du Pacifique," Post-Print halshs-00722665, HAL.
    8. Aubert, Cecile & Rey, Patrick & Kovacic, William E., 2006. "The impact of leniency and whistle-blowing programs on cartels," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1241-1266, November.
    9. Patrice Bougette & Christian Montet & Florent Venayre, 2006. "L'efficacité économique des programmes de clémence," Post-Print halshs-00476807, HAL.
    10. Patrice Bougette & Christian Montet & Florent Venayre, 2006. "Jeux de négociation dans les affaires antitrust : engagements et transaction," Post-Print halshs-00476774, HAL.
    11. Florent Venayre, 2011. "Les lacunes du transfert de la compétence économique à la Polynésie française," Post-Print halshs-00652154, HAL.
    12. Florent Venayre, 2012. "Interventionnisme public et handicaps de compétitivité: analyse du cas polynésien," Post-Print halshs-00695278, HAL.
    13. Florent Venayre, 2012. "Concentration dans la distribution alimentaire en Martinique : jusqu'où prendre en considération les spécificités ultramarines ?," Post-Print halshs-00777709, HAL.
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