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Compétition pour les paiements : une titanomachie revisitée par la modélisation multi-agents

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  • Sandra Deungoue

    (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENS LSH - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

L'objet de cette étude est d'analyser le rôle de la commission interbancaire de paiement sur la compétition entre entreprises de cartes de crédit et sur l'utilisation des instruments de paiement. Le caractère souvent multilatéral de cette commission, ainsi que l'impossibilité pour certains commerçants de pratiquer une discrimination entre instruments de paiement ont conduit les autorités de concurrence de différents pays à s'interroger sur la légalité de ces accords ainsi que sur le niveau optimal de ladite commission. En nous servant de la modélisation multi–agents, nous simulons un modèle de compétition bancaire permettant d'observer le niveau du bien-être général ainsi que le degré de compétition sur chaque face du marché pour différentes valeurs de la commission interchange.

Suggested Citation

  • Sandra Deungoue, 2008. "Compétition pour les paiements : une titanomachie revisitée par la modélisation multi-agents," Post-Print halshs-00269129, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00269129
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00269129
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    References listed on IDEAS

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