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Typologie de controle interorganisationnel: le cas de la relation entre un équipementier automobile et ses fournisseurs

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  • Gwenaëlle Nogatchewsky

    (DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Cet article rend compte d'une recherche menée au sein d'un équipementier automobile sur le contrôle qu'il exerce sur ses fournisseurs. Le contrôle est vu comme processus d'influence et de régulation dans une perspective de coordination des activités tout au long de la coopération. Quatre phases ont ainsi été identifiées : la sélection, la finalisation, le pilotage et la post-évaluation. Les critères de sélection portent non seulement sur les compétences du fournisseur mais également sur le rapport de force entre les partenaires potentiels. La finalisation consiste en la définition des objectifs et des moyens. Cette phase est souvent sanctionnée par la signature du contrat qui a davantage un rôle de formalisation et de mémoire de la coopération que de protection contre l'opportunisme du partenaire commercial. En phase de pilotage, le client utilise conjointement ou séparément trois types de contrôle sur les résultats, les procédés de travail et les comportements en fonction du rapport de pouvoir et de dépendance des parties. Plus le client et le fournisseur sont interdépendants, plus le contrôle est complet combinant à la fois des aspects formels liés aux dispositifs mis en place et informels liés aux relations personnelles qu'entretiennent les partenaires commerciaux. Enfin, la post-évaluation consiste en la mise en œuvre des sanctions et des récompenses du client vers son fournisseur.Cette recherche met également l'accent sur l'importance des relations interpersonnelles pour contrer les effets négatifs d'un rapport de force défavorable. La partie dominée cherche à exercer un contrôle qualifié d'affectif en développant des relations proches, voire amicales ; ce qui lui permet d'obtenir des informations et d'exercer un contrôle informel sur celui qui a le pouvoir. L'encastrement des relations sociales dans les transactions économiques apparaît dès lors comme une stratégie d'acteurs dominés.

Suggested Citation

  • Gwenaëlle Nogatchewsky, 2002. "Typologie de controle interorganisationnel: le cas de la relation entre un équipementier automobile et ses fournisseurs," Post-Print halshs-00144679, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00144679
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00144679
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    References listed on IDEAS

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