IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/halshs-00142671.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

How the court made a federation of the EU

Author

Listed:
  • Jean-Michel Josselin

    (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Alain Marciano

    (URCA - Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne, EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We analyze the European institutional integration that took place in the 1950s and 1960s as a two-stage process. Firstly, an explicitly political project aims at establishing a European political community. The project is abandoned in the mid-1950s and political integration stops. At that time, the institutions of the Union take the form of a confederation. In a second stage, because of the failure of the European political community, a legal process of integration driven by the European Court of Justice takes place. This second stage of unification is more centralizing and in effect leads to a federalization of the European institutional structure. The transformation of the political structure of the European Union thus appears to result from the actions and decisions of a legal entity, the European Court of Justice.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Michel Josselin & Alain Marciano, 2007. "How the court made a federation of the EU," Post-Print halshs-00142671, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00142671
    DOI: 10.1007/s11558-006-9001-y
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean-Michel Josselin & Alain Marciano, 2000. "Displacing your Principal. Two Historical Case Studies of Some Interest for the Constitutional Future of Europe," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 217-233, November.
    2. Jean-Michel Josselin & Alain Marciano, 2003. "From economic to legal competition : New perspectives on European federalism," Post-Print halshs-00076679, HAL.
    3. Kitzinger, U. W., 1960. "Europe: The Six and the Seven," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 20-36, January.
    4. Randall Holcombe, 1996. "Vibert's vision: Constitutional theory in search of a constitution," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 281-291, December.
    5. Tridimas, George & Tridimas, Takis, 2004. "National courts and the European Court of Justice: a public choice analysis of the preliminary reference procedure," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 125-145, June.
    6. Alain Marciano & Jean-Michel Josselin (ed.), 2003. "From Economic to Legal Competition," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2730.
    7. Jean-Michel Josselin & Alain Marciano, 2004. "Federalism and subsidiarity in national and international contexts," Post-Print halshs-00076694, HAL.
    8. Stefan Voigt, "undated". "Iudex Calculat: The ECJ's Quest for Power," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2003-1-1066, Berkeley Electronic Press.
    9. Jean-Michel Josselin & Alain Marciano, 2005. "Administrative law and economics," Post-Print halshs-00103728, HAL.
    10. SALMON, Pierre, 2002. "Accounting for centralisation in the European Union : Niskanen, Monnet or Thatcher?," LATEC - Document de travail - Economie (1991-2003) 2002-05, LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne.
    11. Randall Holcombe, 1991. "Constitutions as constraints: A case study of three american constitutions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 303-328, September.
    12. Roland Vaubel, 1996. "The constitutional future of the European Union," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 317-324, December.
    13. Dennis Mueller, 1996. "Constitutional quandaries in Europe," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 293-302, December.
    14. Anonymous, 1953. "European Defense Community," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(3), pages 441-441, August.
    15. James Buchanan, 1996. "Europe as social reality," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 253-256, December.
    16. Karp, Basil, 1954. "The Draft Constitution for a European Political Community," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 181-202, May.
    17. Bruno Frey, 1996. "A directly democratic and Federal Europe," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 267-279, December.
    18. Stefan Voigt & Eli M. Salzberger, 2002. "Choosing Not To Choose: When Politicians Choose To Delegate Powers," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(2), pages 289-310, May.
    19. Vaubel, Roland, 1997. "The constitutional reform of the European Union," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 443-450, April.
    20. Alter, Karen J., 1998. "Who Are the “Masters of the Treaty”?: European Governments and the European Court of Justice," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(1), pages 121-147, January.
    21. Jean-Yves Pitarakis & George Tridimas, 2003. "Joint Dynamics of Legal and Economic Integration in the European Union," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 357-368, November.
    22. Holcombe, R.G., 1998. "Constitutional Theory and the Constitutional History of Colonial America," Working Papers 1998_03_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
    23. Garrett, Geoffrey & Kelemen, R. Daniel & Schulz, Heiner, 1998. "The European Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(1), pages 149-176, January.
    24. Dennis Mueller, 2005. "Constitutional political economy in the European Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 57-73, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Carsten Hefeker & Michael Neugart, 2016. "Policy deviations, uncertainty, and the European Court of Justice," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 547-567, December.
    2. Roland Vaubel, 2009. "Constitutional courts as promoters of political centralization: lessons for the European Court of Justice," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 203-222, December.
    3. Knoll Bodo & Koenig Andreas, 2011. "Leviathan Europa – Stärkung der Nationalstaaten und der EU durch konstitutionelle Schranken?," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 60(2), pages 127-145, August.
    4. Grimmel, Andreas, 2011. "Politics in robes? The European Court of Justice and the myth of judicial activism," Discussion Papers 2/11, Europa-Kolleg Hamburg, Institute for European Integration.
    5. Andreas Grimmel, 2011. "Integration and the Context of Law: Why the European Court of Justice is not a Political Actor," Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po 3, Centre d'études européennes (CEE) at Sciences Po, Paris.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Knoll Bodo & Koenig Andreas, 2011. "Leviathan Europa – Stärkung der Nationalstaaten und der EU durch konstitutionelle Schranken?," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 60(2), pages 127-145, August.
    2. Jean-Michel Josselin & Alain Marciano, 2000. "Displacing your Principal. Two Historical Case Studies of Some Interest for the Constitutional Future of Europe," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 217-233, November.
    3. Klaudijo Klaser, 2020. "A Theory of Justice of John Rawls as Basis for European Fiscal Union," Review of Economics and Institutions, Università di Perugia, vol. 11(1-2).
    4. Jean Michel Josselin & Alain Marciano, 2006. "The political economy of European federalism," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 200607, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
    5. George Tridimas, 2004. "A Political Economy Perspective of Judicial Review in the European Union: Judicial Appointments Rule, Accessibility and Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 99-116, July.
    6. Klaudijo Klaser, 2018. "The European Social Welfare Function Shaped on a Difference Principle: A Normative Rawlsian Approach in Favour of Fiscal Union," CESifo Working Paper Series 7186, CESifo.
    7. Carsten Hefeker & Michael Neugart, 2016. "Policy deviations, uncertainty, and the European Court of Justice," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 547-567, December.
    8. Lars P. Feld & Horst Zimmermann & Thomas Döring, 2003. "Föderalismus, Dezentralität und Wirtschaftswachstum," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 72(3), pages 361-377.
    9. Tracy H. Slagter, 2009. "National Parliaments and the ECJ: A View from the Bundestag," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 175-197, January.
    10. José Luis Castro-Montero & Edwin Alblas & Arthur Dyevre & Nicolas Lampach, 2018. "The Court of Justice and treaty revision: A case of strategic leniency?," European Union Politics, , vol. 19(4), pages 570-596, December.
    11. Raffaella SANTOLINI, 2007. "An Empitical Analysis of Political and Informative Trends on Municipalities of an Italian Region," Working Papers 294, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    12. Lars P. Feld, 2006. "Regulatory Competition and Federalism in Switzerland: Diffusion by Horizontal and Vertical Interaction," CREMA Working Paper Series 2006-22, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    13. Lars Hornuf & Stefan Voigt, 2015. "Analyzing preliminary references as the powerbase of the European Court of Justice," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 287-311, April.
    14. Kerber, Wolfgang & Eckardt, Martina, 2005. "Policy learning in Europe: The 'open method of coordination' and laboratory federalism," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 48, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
    15. Nicole Lindstrom, 2010. "Service Liberalization in the Enlarged EU: A Race to the Bottom or the Emergence of Transnational Political Conflict?," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(5), pages 1307-1327, November.
    16. Agostini, Claudio A. & Brown, Philip H. & Zhang, Xiaobo, 2010. "Neighbor effects in the provision of public goods in a young democracy: Evidence from China," IFPRI discussion papers 1027, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    17. Thierry Madiès & Sonia Paty & Yvon Rocaboy, 2005. "Externalités fiscales horizontales et verticales. Où en est la théorie du fédéralisme financier ?," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 115(1), pages 17-63.
    18. Lars P. Feld & Gebhard Kirchgässner & Christoph A. Schaltegger, 2004. "Fiscal Federalism and Economic Performance: Evidence from Swiss Cantons," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200420, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    19. Eric Dubois & Sonia Paty, 2010. "Yardstick competition: which neighbours matter?," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 44(3), pages 433-452, June.
    20. Andreas Grimmel, 2011. "Integration and the Context of Law: Why the European Court of Justice is not a Political Actor," Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po 3, Centre d'études européennes (CEE) at Sciences Po, Paris.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    European Union; Agency theory; European Court of Justice; Federation; Centralization; History of the EU;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
    • N41 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00142671. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.