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Vibert's vision: Constitutional theory in search of a constitution

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  • Randall Holcombe

Abstract

Frank Vibert's book, Europe: A Constitution for the Millennium, draws on constitutional economics to describe how a European constitution should be developed to govern a European political union. Vibert's theoretical constitutional framework is solid, but his analysis has two shortcomings. First, he discusses constitutional theory but never presents any specific constitutional provisions that would be based on that theory. This makes the feasibility of drawing up an acceptable constitution appear more straightforward than it actually is. Second, he assumes that Europe will eventually be politically unified in much the same manner as the United States, and does not consider alternatives. Rather than having a single European government, as Vibert suggests, a better alternative would be to have European nations united through a variety of treaties, agreements, and multinational organizations. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996

Suggested Citation

  • Randall Holcombe, 1996. "Vibert's vision: Constitutional theory in search of a constitution," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 281-291, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:7:y:1996:i:4:p:281-291
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00119268
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. McGuire, Robert A & Ohsfeldt, Robert L, 1989. "Self-interest, Agency Theory, and Political Voting Behavior: The Ratification of the United States Constitution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 219-234, March.
    2. Beard, Charles A., 1913. "An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, edition 127, number beard1913.
    3. Randall Holcombe, 1991. "Constitutions as constraints: A case study of three american constitutions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 303-328, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Michel Josselin & Alain Marciano, 2007. "How the court made a federation of the EU," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 59-75, March.
    2. Frank Vibert, 1999. "How Not to Write a Constitution—The Maastricht/Amsterdam Treaties," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 149-166, June.

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    Keywords

    H1;

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government

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