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The constitutional future of the European Union

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  • Roland Vaubel

Abstract

The formal distinction between a treaty and a constitution is much less important than the question of who is authorized to interpret and amend it. The judges of the European Court of Justice interpret the Treaty by simple majority, while unanimity of the member-states would be required to reverse these decisions. The European Union needs a Court whose judges are empanelled from, and selected by, the highest courts of the member-states. The Treaty on European Union violates three fundamental constitutional principles: (i) the principle of the separation of powers, (ii) the democratic principle, and (iii) the principle of subsidiarity. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996

Suggested Citation

  • Roland Vaubel, 1996. "The constitutional future of the European Union," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 317-324, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:7:y:1996:i:4:p:317-324
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00119272
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    1. Roland Vaubel, 1996. "Constitutional safeguards against centralization in federal states: An international cross-section analysis," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 79-102, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marcus Matthias Keupp, 2021. "Defense Economics," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-3-030-73815-0, April.
    2. Klaudijo Klaser, 2020. "A Theory of Justice of John Rawls as Basis for European Fiscal Union," Review of Economics and Institutions, Università di Perugia, vol. 11(1-2).
    3. Klaudijo Klaser, 2018. "The European Social Welfare Function Shaped on a Difference Principle: A Normative Rawlsian Approach in Favour of Fiscal Union," CESifo Working Paper Series 7186, CESifo.
    4. Jean-Michel Josselin & Alain Marciano, 2007. "How the court made a federation of the EU," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 59-75, March.
    5. Marcus Matthias Keupp, 2021. "Opportunities for Reform," Springer Books, in: Defense Economics, chapter 0, pages 115-134, Springer.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    H1; K3;

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K3 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law

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