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Constitutional quandaries in Europe

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  • Dennis Mueller

Abstract

Most of the constitutional political economy literature has followed Buchanan and Tullock by remaining inherently normative, but a small literature has appeared that examines the properties of constitutions by considering the motives of the people who actually write the constitution. This literature is in the positive public choice tradition, in that it assumes that the people who write a constitution are interested in advancing their interests and not those of someone else. This note discusses the need for and nature of a constitution that would advance the interests of all citizens, and then the procedures that would be necessary to create and adopt such a constitution. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996

Suggested Citation

  • Dennis Mueller, 1996. "Constitutional quandaries in Europe," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 293-302, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:7:y:1996:i:4:p:293-302
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00119269
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 2006. "The Power to Tax," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027922, October.
    2. Mueller, Dennis C, 1991. "Constitutional Rights," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(2), pages 313-333, Fall.
    3. Schneider Friedrich, 1992. "The Federal And Fiscal Structures Of Representative And Direct Democracies As Models For A European Federal Union: Some Ideas Using The Public-Choice Approach," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 403-438, December.
    4. Randall Holcombe, 1991. "Constitutions as constraints: A case study of three american constitutions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 303-328, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. George Winterton, 1998. "Australia’s Constitutional Convention 1998," Agenda - A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics, vol. 5(1), pages 97-109.
    2. Jean-Michel Josselin & Alain Marciano, 2007. "How the court made a federation of the EU," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 59-75, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    D71; D72; 052;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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