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Structure de l'impôt et cycle électoral au plan municipal

Author

Listed:
  • Marie-Estelle Binet

    (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Jean-Sébastien Pentecôte

    (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

[fre] Cet article s'inscrit dans le champ des choix publics. On y analyse le comportement des élus locaux pendant la durée de leur mandat, en distinguant les périodes électorale et non électorale. Les conditions d’occurrence et les propriétés du cycle budgétaire électoral sont ainsi étudiées au plan municipal. D’abord , un cadre théorique original permet d’éclairer le lien entre la structure de la fiscalité locale et les comportements publics observés à l’échelle communale en France. Une étude empirique est ensuite menée sur l’ensemble des grandes communes françaises à partir d’un modèle dynamique de panel. Les résultats attestent de la manipulation des instruments budgétaires par les élus à l’approche des élections, conformément aux prédictions du modèle théorique. [eng] This article addresses an issue of public-policy choice. We analyze the behavior of local elected officials during their terms of office, with a distinction between election and non-election periods. Accordingly, we examine the conditions of occurrence and the properties of the political business cycle at the municipal level. First, we offer an original theoretical framework to shed light on the link between local tax structure and public-policy behavior observed at the municipal level in France. We then use a dynamic panel-data model to conduct a study of all of France‘s larger communes i.e., municipalities. As forecast by the theoretical model , our results show that elected officials avail themselves of fiscal instruments in the run-up to elections.
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Suggested Citation

  • Marie-Estelle Binet & Jean-Sébastien Pentecôte, 2006. "Structure de l'impôt et cycle électoral au plan municipal," Post-Print halshs-00109689, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00109689
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    1. Julien Vandernoot & Jonathan Bauweraerts & Antoine Buchet, 2019. "Do elections influence taxation?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(2), pages 854-865.

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