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Organisations complexes et incitations : l'efficacité de la négociation collective

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  • Bruno Lamotte

    (LEPII - Laboratoire d'Economie de la Production et de l'Intégration Internationale - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

The complexity of work was a subject of many studies for the theorists of value and exploitation. Nowadays, economic analysis focuses on other problems : complex organizations and problems brought by complexity are numerous in industry and services. We discuss here three of them : the organization of production and the question of skills, wages (how to account for the results of the workers ? ) and the efficiency of the bargaining process in the case of complex organizations.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno Lamotte, 2004. "Organisations complexes et incitations : l'efficacité de la négociation collective," Post-Print halshs-00103981, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00103981
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00103981
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Richard B. Freeman & James L. Medoff, 1980. "Le syndicalisme à deux visages," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 31(3), pages 505-539.
    2. Robert Gibbons, 1998. "Incentives in Organizations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 115-132, Fall.
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