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Pay for performance where output is hard to measure: the case of performance pay for school teachers

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  • Marsden, David
  • Belfield, Richard

Abstract

The introduction of performance-related pay with Performance Management in the state school sector of England and Wales represents a considerable change in the school management system. After 2000, all teachers were subject to annual goal setting performance reviews. Experienced teachers were offered an extended pay scale based on performance instead of seniority, and to gain access to the new upper pay scale, teachers had to go through a 'threshold assessment' based on their professional skills and performance. This paper reports the results of a panel survey of classroom and head teachers which started in 2000 just before implementation of the new system, and then after one and after four years of operation. We find that both classroom and head teacher views have changed considerably over time, from initial general skepticism and opposition towards a more positive view, especially among head teachers by 2004. We argue that the adoption of an integrative bargaining approach to performance reviews explains why a growing minority of schools have achieved improved goal setting, and improved pupil attainments as they have implemented performance management. Pay for performance has been one of the measures of organizational support that head teachers could bring to induce changes in teachers' classroom priorities. We argue that the teachers' case shows that a wider range of performance incentives than previously thought can be offered to employees in such occupations, provided that goal setting and performance measurement are approached as a form of negotiation instead of top-down.
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  • Marsden, David & Belfield, Richard, 2006. "Pay for performance where output is hard to measure: the case of performance pay for school teachers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 22871, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:22871
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
    2. Richard Belfield & David Marsden, 2005. "Performance Pay for Teachers: Linking Individual and Organisational Level Targets," CEP Discussion Papers dp0703, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    3. Atkinson, Adele & Burgess, Simon & Croxson, Bronwyn & Gregg, Paul & Propper, Carol & Slater, Helen & Wilson, Deborah, 2009. "Evaluating the impact of performance-related pay for teachers in England," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 251-261, June.
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    9. Teulings,Coen & Hartog,Joop, 2008. "Corporatism or Competition?," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521049399.
    10. Marsden, David, 2000. "Teachers before the 'threshold'," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3641, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    11. Nick Adnett, 2003. "Commentary. Reforming teachers' pay: incentive payments, collegiate ethos and UK policy," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 27(1), pages 145-157, January.
    12. James M. Malcomson, 1997. "Contracts, Hold-Up, and Labor Markets," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(4), pages 1916-1957, December.
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    14. Howard Glennerster, 2001. "United Kingdom Education 1997-2001," CASE Papers case50, Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, LSE.
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    Cited by:

    1. David Marsden, 2006. "Individual Employee Voice: Renegotiation and Performance Management in Public Services," CEP Discussion Papers dp0752, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    2. Helen Simpson, 2009. "Productivity In Public Services," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(2), pages 250-276, April.
    3. David Marsden, 2009. "The Paradox of Performance Related Pay Systems: 'Why Do We Keep Adopting Them in the Face of Evidence that they Fail to Motivate?'," CEP Discussion Papers dp0946, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    4. Michael J. Podgursky & Matthew G. Springer, 2007. "Teacher performance pay: A review," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(4), pages 909-950.
    5. Marsden, David, 2015. "Teachers and performance pay in 2014: first results of a survey," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 61030, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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    JEL classification:

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