Pay for performance where output is hard to measure: the case of performance pay for school teachers
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- Richard Belfield & David Marsden, 2006. "Pay for Performance Where Output is Hard to Measure: the Case of Performance Pay for School Teachers," CEP Discussion Papers dp0747, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Marsden, David & Belfield, Richard, 2006. "Pay for performance where output is hard to measure: the case of performance pay for school teachers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 4675, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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CEP Discussion Papers
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Citations
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Cited by:
- David Marsden, 2006.
"Individual Employee Voice: Renegotiation and Performance Management in Public Services,"
CEP Discussion Papers
dp0752, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Marsden, David, 2007. "Individual employee voice: renegotiation and performance management in public services," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3531, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Marsden, David, 2006. "Individual employee voice: renegotiation and performance management in public services," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3629, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Helen Simpson, 2009.
"Productivity In Public Services,"
Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(2), pages 250-276, April.
- Helen Simpson, 2007. "Productivity in Public Services," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 07/164, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
- David Marsden, 2009.
"The Paradox of Performance Related Pay Systems: 'Why Do We Keep Adopting Them in the Face of Evidence that they Fail to Motivate?',"
CEP Discussion Papers
dp0946, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Marsden, David, 2009. "The paradox of performance related pay systems: ‘why do we keep adopting them in the face of evidence that they fail to motivate?’," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 25357, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Michael J. Podgursky & Matthew G. Springer, 2007. "Teacher performance pay: A review," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(4), pages 909-950.
- Marsden, David, 2015.
"Teachers and performance pay in 2014: first results of a survey,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
61030, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- David Marsden, 2015. "Teachers and Performance Pay in 2014: First Results of a Survey," CEP Discussion Papers dp1332, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
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JEL classification:
- J1 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics
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