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La spécialité de formation : un "signal" de compétences spécifiques et générales

Author

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  • Mireille Bruyère

    (LIRHE - Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire de recherche sur les Ressources Humaines et l'Emploi - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Philippe Lemistre

    (LIRHE - Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire de recherche sur les Ressources Humaines et l'Emploi - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Le pilotage des politiques éducatives de développement des formations professionnelles suppose que la formation dans une spécialité donnée est nécessaire pour accéder à un emploi de spécialité similaire. Cette hypothèse « d'adéquationniste » est réinterrogée via la génération de sortants des filières professionnelles en 1998 observés en 2001. Pour cette génération, la majorité des jeunes occupent en 2001 un emploi d'une spécialité autre que leur spécialité de formation. Pour autant, la formation spécifique à l'emploi est rentable, le rendement salarial de l'adéquation étant relativement important. Toutefois, la spécialité de formation a également un rendement salarial indépendamment de la spécialité d'emploi. Ainsi, les employeurs ne rémunèrent pas seulement la correspondance avec la spécialité d'emploi, ils hiérarchisent également les spécialités en fonction d'un contenu transférable. Alors que se construit le cadre européen de qualification (CEQ) pour les formations professionnelles, leur contenu transférable ne devra donc pas être négligé parmi les compétences clés à définir

Suggested Citation

  • Mireille Bruyère & Philippe Lemistre, 2006. "La spécialité de formation : un "signal" de compétences spécifiques et générales," Post-Print halshs-00009969, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00009969
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00009969
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John G. Riley, 2001. "Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 432-478, June.
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