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Évaluation des programmes d'infrastructure : ordre optimal de réalisation sous contrainte financière

Author

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  • William Roy

    (LET - Laboratoire d'économie des transports - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENTPE - École Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'État - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

L'État n'est pas en mesure de financer sans délais l'ensemble des projets d'infrastructure de transport socio-économiquement rentables. La sélection opérée par les analyses coûts-avantages n'est pas suffisante, un arbitrage supplémentaire est nécessaire pour définir les projets qui seront prioritairement réalisés. C'est ce choix, structurant les programmes d'infrastructure, auquel nous souhaitons associer des recommandations normatives. Nous proposons un modèle analytique permettant de démontrer que le critère pertinent pour hiérarchiser les projets est le ratio entre utilité collective et montant de subvention. La modélisation conduit à penser qu'il est préférable de privilégier les projets créant le plus de valeur sociale par euro public investi. L'étude détaillée des hypothèses les plus restrictives du modèle de base conduisant à ce résultat permet d'affiner le domaine de validité du critère. En outre, ce ratio est tout à fait cohérent avec l'évolution partenariale des financements de projets d'infrastructure.

Suggested Citation

  • William Roy, 2005. "Évaluation des programmes d'infrastructure : ordre optimal de réalisation sous contrainte financière," Post-Print halshs-00003971, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00003971
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00003971v2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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