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Cooperation Between Terrorist Groups: Behaviors and Strategies

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  • Sylvain Baumann

    (EDEHN - Equipe d'Economie Le Havre Normandie - ULH - Université Le Havre Normandie - NU - Normandie Université)

Abstract

This article presents some model of cooperation between terrorist groups through a game-theoretic view in order to study their strategies. It is relevant to consider several cases corresponding to the presence or not of an international organization, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to analyze their behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Sylvain Baumann, 2020. "Cooperation Between Terrorist Groups: Behaviors and Strategies," Post-Print hal-02949071, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02949071
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02949071
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sandler, Todd & Enders, Walter, 2004. "An economic perspective on transnational terrorism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 301-316, June.
    2. Lapan, Harvey E & Sandler, Todd, 1988. "To Bargain or Not to Bargain: That Is the Question," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 16-21, May.
    3. Lapan, Harvey E. & Sandler, Todd, 1993. "Terrorism and signalling," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 383-397, August.
    4. Sandler, Todd & Tschirhart, John T. & Cauley, Jon, 1983. "A Theoretical Analysis of Transnational Terrorism," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(1), pages 36-54, March.
    5. Sandler, Todd & Lapan, Harvey E., 1988. "The Calculus of Dissent: An Analysis of Terrorists' Choice of Targets," Staff General Research Papers Archive 10818, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Security; Terrorism; Conflict; Cooperation;
    All these keywords.

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