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Un nouveau contrat entre le consommateur et son fournisseur de viande bovine

Author

Listed:
  • Jean Cordier

    (ESR - Unité de recherche d'Économie et Sociologie Rurales - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique)

  • . Eaae

    (EAAE - European Association of Agricultural Economists)

  • . Inra

Abstract

La viande bovine correspond à un bien de confiance La réputation du fournisseur et la confiance du consommateur sont déterminants dans la relation commerciale. Historiquement, le contrat implicite passé entre le boucher traditionnel et le consommateur était adéquat. Mais le développement industriel et la distribution de masse ont rompu le contrat. Les tentatives de restauration du contrat ne portent que sur des quantités marginales. C'est pourquoi un nouveau contrat est requis. Le Code Qualité Viande Bovine est construit sur la base d'une convention de qualification professionnelle pour chaque maillon de la filière et sur une coordination verticale de ces conventions. Ce code doit apporter au fournisseur, qu'il soit industriel ou distributeur, tous les éléments de qualité qu'il ne peut directement contrôler. Ainsi, il peut répondre à la demande multifactorielle actuelle du consommateur et se préparer avec ses partenaires aux attentes futures qui se dessinent.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean Cordier & . Eaae & . Inra, 1998. "Un nouveau contrat entre le consommateur et son fournisseur de viande bovine," Post-Print hal-02841295, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02841295
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-02841295
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    References listed on IDEAS

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