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Can multimarket competition theory explain why manufacturers are reluctant to adopt e-commerce ? The case of the French household appliances’ manufacturers

Author

Listed:
  • Madeleine Besson

    (LITEM - Laboratoire en Innovation, Technologies, Economie et Management (EA 7363) - EESC-GEM Grenoble Ecole de Management - UEVE - Université d'Évry-Val-d'Essonne - TEM - Télécom Ecole de Management, IMT-BS - MMS - Département Management, Marketing et Stratégie - TEM - Télécom Ecole de Management - IMT - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] - IMT-BS - Institut Mines-Télécom Business School - IMT - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris])

  • Bernard Bourdon

    (IRG - Institut de Recherche en Gestion - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12)

Abstract

With turnover of more than €51 billion in France in 2013, e-commerce continues to grow, both in volume and number of players. While economic theories suggest that manufacturers should integrate intermediation functions as soon as they are able to perform them at a lower cost than external operators, few French manufacturers are engaging in e-commerce. In this research, we explore why manufacturers of household appliance do not launch e-commerce sites. Our results suggest that, in accordance with multimarket competition theory, they do so in order to avoid coercion from the traditional French distribution system.

Suggested Citation

  • Madeleine Besson & Bernard Bourdon, 2015. "Can multimarket competition theory explain why manufacturers are reluctant to adopt e-commerce ? The case of the French household appliances’ manufacturers," Post-Print hal-02387337, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02387337
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02387337v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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