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The Effect of Bid Rigging on Prices: A Study of the Highway Construction Industry

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  • Srabana Gupta

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  • Srabana Gupta, 2001. "The Effect of Bid Rigging on Prices: A Study of the Highway Construction Industry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 19(4), pages 451-465, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:19:y:2001:i:4:p:451-465
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1012568509136
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    8. Rotemberg, Julio J & Woodford, Michael, 1992. "Oligopolistic Pricing and the Effects of Aggregate Demand on Economic Activity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(6), pages 1153-1207, December.
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    13. Porter, Robert H & Zona, J Douglas, 1993. "Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(3), pages 518-538, June.
    14. Brannman, Lance Eric, 1996. "Potential Competition and Possible Collusion in Forest Service Timber Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(4), pages 730-745, October.
    15. Froeb, Luke M. & Koyak, Robert A. & Werden, Gregory J., 1993. "What is the effect of bid-rigging on prices?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 419-423.
    16. Evans, William N & Froeb, Luke M & Werden, Gregory J, 1993. "Endogeneity in the Concentration-Price Relationship: Causes, Consequences, and Cures," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(4), pages 431-438, December.
    17. William N. Evans & Ioannis N. Kessides, 1994. "Living by the "Golden Rule": Multimarket Contact in the U. S. Airline Industry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(2), pages 341-366.
    18. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Rondeau & Pascal Courty & Maurice Doyon, 2016. "Simultaneous Allocation of Bundled Goods through Auctions: Assessing the Case for Joint Bidding," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 98(3), pages 838-859.
    2. Blanchflower, David G., 2007. "Entrepreneurship in the United States," IZA Discussion Papers 3130, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. de Leverano, Adriano, 2019. "Collusion through market sharing agreements: Evidence from Quebec's road paving market," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-053, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    4. David Blanchflower, 2009. "Minority self-employment in the United States and the impact of affirmative action programs," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 361-396, June.
    5. Antonio Estache & Atsushi Iimi, 2009. "Joint Bidding, Governance And Public Procurement Costs:A Case Of Road Projects," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 80(3), pages 393-429, September.
    6. Nyström, Johan & Wikström, Daniel, 2019. "Empirical analysis of unbalanced bidding on Swedish roads," Working Papers 2019:4, Swedish National Road & Transport Research Institute (VTI).
    7. Ilya Morozov & Elena Podkolzina, 2013. "Collusion detection in procurement auctions," HSE Working papers WP BRP 25/EC/2013, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    8. Xiaowei Wang & Wuyan Long & Meiyue Sang & Yang Yang, 2022. "Towards Sustainable Urbanization: Exploring the Influence Paths of the Urban Environment on Bidders’ Collusive Willingness," Land, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-14, February.
    9. Atsushi Iimi, 2007. "Aid and competition in procurement auctions: a case of highway projects," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(7), pages 997-1015.
    10. Balaguer, Jacint & Orts, Vicente & Uriel, Ezequiel, 2007. "Testing price-fixing agreements in a multimarket context: The European case of vitamin C," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-257.
    11. Mats A. Bergman & Johan Lundberg & Sofia Lundberg & Johan Y. Stake, 2020. "Interactions Across Firms and Bid Rigging," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 56(1), pages 107-130, February.
    12. Barbosa, Klênio & Fiuza, Eduardo Pedral Sampaio, 2012. "Demand aggregation and credit risk effects in pooled procurement: evidence from the Brazilian public purchases of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies," Textos para discussão 299, FGV EESP - Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Fundação Getulio Vargas (Brazil).
    13. Arno Van Der Vlist & Sander Hardeman, 2011. "On the Design of Public Infrastructure procurements," ERSA conference papers ersa10p1060, European Regional Science Association.
    14. Iimi, Atsushi, 2004. "(Anti-)Competitive effect of joint bidding: evidence from ODA procurement auctions," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 416-439, September.
    15. Grigoli, Francesco & Mills, Zachary, 2011. "Do high and volatile levels of public investment suggest misconduct ? the role of institutional quality," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5735, The World Bank.
    16. Bergman, Mats A. & Lundberg, Johan & Lundberg, Sofia & Stake, Johan Y., 2015. "Using spatial econometrics to test for collusive behavior in procurement auction data," Umeå Economic Studies 917, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    17. Jacint Balaguer & Ezequiel Uriel Jiménez & Vicente Orts, 2005. "Testing Collusive Prices In A Multimarket Context: The European Case Of Vitamin C," Working Papers. Serie EC 2005-06, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).

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