On the merit of equal pay : Performance manipulation and incentive setting
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DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.12.006
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Simon Dato & Eberhard Feess & Petra Nieken, 2022. "Lying in Competitive Environments: A Clean Identification of Behavioral Impacts," CESifo Working Paper Series 9861, CESifo.
- Werner, Peter, 2023.
"Wage negotiations and strategic responses to transparency,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 209(C), pages 161-175.
- Werner, Peter, 2019. "Wage negotiations and strategic responses to transparency," VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy 203567, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Yuan, Sai & Zhou, Ran & Li, Mengna & Lv, Chengchao, 2023. "Investigating the influence of digital technology application on employee compensation," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
- Dato, Simon & Feess, Eberhard & Nieken, Petra, 2024.
"Lying in competitive environments: Identifying behavioral impacts,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 170(C).
- Dato, Simon & Nieken, Petra & Feess, Eberhard, 2024. "Lying in Competitive Environments: Identifying Behavioral Impacts," VfS Annual Conference 2024 (Berlin): Upcoming Labor Market Challenges 302385, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Awaya, Yu & Do, Jihwan, 2022. "Incentives under equal-pay constraint and subjective peer evaluation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 41-59.
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Keywords
Influence activities; Incentive theory; Theory of the firm; Organizational economics;All these keywords.
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