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The inpact of the remuneration committee on the CEO pay-performance sensitivity
[Rémunération des dirigeants et caractéristiques des comités de rémunérations des sociétés du SBF 120]

Author

Listed:
  • Ali Dardour

    (École doctorale de Sciences de Gestion - IAE - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises - Toulouse)

  • Rim Boussaada
  • Hazar Ben Barka

    (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord - UP13 - Université Paris 13 - USPC - Université Sorbonne Paris Cité - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

The research aims to study the influence of the remuneration committee characteristics on the CEO pay-performance sensitivity. Conducted on a sample of listed companies in the SBF 120 over the period 2010-2011, the results show that the number of directorships held by members and the number of committee meetings influence this sensitivity. Other measures such as the size of the committee, attendance, and the gender diversity have no effect. Furthermore, institutional investors are more active on their monitoring role than other types of shareholders. Their presence affects positively and significantly the pay for performance sensitivity.

Suggested Citation

  • Ali Dardour & Rim Boussaada & Hazar Ben Barka, 2015. "The inpact of the remuneration committee on the CEO pay-performance sensitivity [Rémunération des dirigeants et caractéristiques des comités de rémunérations des sociétés du SBF 120]," Post-Print hal-02064451, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02064451
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02064451
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    References listed on IDEAS

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