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Rendre compte de la rémunération des dirigeants. Qu’attendre du say on pay?

Author

Listed:
  • François Belot

    (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CY - CY Cergy Paris Université)

  • Edith Ginglinger

    (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CY - CY Cergy Paris Université)

Abstract

Le Say on Pay, introduit en France par le code de gouvernance AFEP-MEDEF 2013, permet aux actionnaires de s'exprimer sur la rémunération des dirigeants par un vote en assemblée générale. Cet article propose une revue des études menées dans les pays où le Say on Pay est en vigueur depuis plusieurs années. Les actionnaires contestent peu les rémunérations qui leur sont soumises, mais lorsqu'ils le font, la sensibilité des rémunérations à la performance de l'entreprise s'accroît. L'augmentation de l'influence des entreprises de conseil en votes et l'amélioration du dialogue entre actionnaires, administrateurs et dirigeants en amont sont les effets les plus tangibles du Say on Pay.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • François Belot & Edith Ginglinger, 2013. "Rendre compte de la rémunération des dirigeants. Qu’attendre du say on pay?," Post-Print hal-02979475, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02979475
    DOI: 10.3166/rfg.237.57-71
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    Cited by:

    1. Ali Dardour & Rim Boussaada & Hazar Ben Barka, 2015. "The inpact of the remuneration committee on the CEO pay-performance sensitivity [Rémunération des dirigeants et caractéristiques des comités de rémunérations des sociétés du SBF 120]," Post-Print hal-02064451, HAL.

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