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Chief Executive Pay and Remuneration Committee Independence

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  • Ian Gregory-Smith

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Suggested Citation

  • Ian Gregory-Smith, 2012. "Chief Executive Pay and Remuneration Committee Independence," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 74(4), pages 510-531, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:obuest:v:74:y:2012:i:4:p:510-531
    DOI: j.1468-0084.2011.00660.x
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1468-0084.2011.00660.x
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Alexander Muravyev & Oleksandr Talavera & Charlie Weir, 2016. "Performance effects of appointing other firms’ executive directors to corporate boards: an analysis of UK firms," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 25-45, January.
    2. Sandra Cavaco & Edouard Challe & Patricia Crifo & Antoine Rebérioux & Gwenaël Roudaut, 2016. "Board independence and operating performance: analysis on (French) company and individual data," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(52), pages 5093-5105, November.
    3. Damon Morris & Ian Gregory-Smith & Brian Main & Alberto Montagnoli & Peter Wright, 2015. "The Impact of 'A - Day' on Executive Pensions and Pay for Performance," Working Papers 2015026, The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics.
    4. Harvey, Charles & Maclean, Mairi & Price, Michael, 2020. "Executive remuneration and the limits of disclosure as an instrument of corporate governance," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    5. Ian Gregory-Smith & Peter W Wright, 2019. "Winners and losers of corporate tournaments," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(1), pages 250-268.
    6. James Walker & Peder Greve & Geoff Wood & Peter Miskell, 2019. "Because you're worth it? Determinants of Vice Chancellor pay in the UK," Industrial Relations Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(5-6), pages 450-467, November.
    7. Akram, Farheen & Abrar ul haq, Muhammad, 2018. "Assessing the Effect of Managerial Power on Firm Performance through the Perceptual Lens of Executive Remuneration," MPRA Paper 100050, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2019.
    8. Alexander Muravyev & Oleksandr Talavera & Charlie Weir, 2016. "Performance effects of appointing other firms’ executive directors to corporate boards: an analysis of UK firms," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 25-45, January.
    9. Ali Dardour & Rim Boussaada & Hazar Ben Barka, 2015. "The inpact of the remuneration committee on the CEO pay-performance sensitivity [Rémunération des dirigeants et caractéristiques des comités de rémunérations des sociétés du SBF 120]," Post-Print hal-02064451, HAL.
    10. Pamela Kent & Kim Kercher & James Routledge, 2018. "Remuneration committees, shareholder dissent on CEO pay and the CEO pay–performance link," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 58(2), pages 445-475, June.
    11. Lu-Ming Tseng, 2019. "How Implicit Ethics Institutionalization Affects Ethical Selling Intention: The Case of Taiwan’s Life Insurance Salespeople," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 727-742, September.

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