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Purpose-driven corporations: how corporate law reorders the field of corporate governance

Author

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  • Blanche Segrestin

    (CGS i3 - Centre de Gestion Scientifique i3 - Mines Paris - PSL (École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris) - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - I3 - Institut interdisciplinaire de l’innovation - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Kevin Levillain

    (CGS i3 - Centre de Gestion Scientifique i3 - Mines Paris - PSL (École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris) - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - I3 - Institut interdisciplinaire de l’innovation - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Armand Hatchuel

    (CGS i3 - Centre de Gestion Scientifique i3 - Mines Paris - PSL (École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris) - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - I3 - Institut interdisciplinaire de l’innovation - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

In a number of States, new legal " benefit " or " purpose " corporate forms are introduced to promote stakeholder-oriented companies. If it is too early to know empirically if this legal framework will work, we can build upon what we know on corporate governance to predict whether it is likely to work or not. In this paper, we present a mapping of the theories on corporate governance and derive some tentative predictions for purpose-driven corporations. We find that theories make diverging predictions, and in a paradoxical way: agency theory is seen as a shareholder-oriented theory, but it supports the new legal forms while stakeholder theory does not. This reordering of the field reveals that theories may overlook the possibility of a legal change. Our work thus contributes to suggest an empirical test of the theories with the purpose-driven companies, but it also opens further avenues to reappraise the theories of corporate governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Blanche Segrestin & Kevin Levillain & Armand Hatchuel, 2016. "Purpose-driven corporations: how corporate law reorders the field of corporate governance," Post-Print hal-01323118, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01323118
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01323118v1
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    Keywords

    Corporate law; purpose-driven corporation; stakeholder; corporate governance; agency theory; stewardship;
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