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Distributed Learning in Hierarchical Networks

Author

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  • Hélène Le Cadre

    (LIMA (CEA, LIST) - Laboratoire Information, Modèles, Apprentissage (CEA, LIST) - DM2I (CEA, LIST) - Département Métrologie Instrumentation & Information (CEA, LIST) - LIST (CEA) - Laboratoire d'Intégration des Systèmes et des Technologies - DRT (CEA) - Direction de Recherche Technologique (CEA) - CEA - Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives - Université Paris-Saclay)

  • Jean-Sébastien Bedo

    (Orange Labs [Paris] - Telecom Orange)

Abstract

In this article, we propose distributed learning based approaches to study the evolution of a decentralized hierarchical system, an illustration of which is the smart grid. Smart grid management requires the control of non-renewable energy production and the inegration of renewable energies which might be highly unpredictable. Indeed, their production levels rely on uncontrolable factors such as sunshine, wind strength, etc. First, we derive optimal control strategies on the non-renewable energy productions and compare competitive learning algorithms to forecast the energy needs of the end users. Second, we introduce an online learning algorithm based on regret minimization enabling the agents to forecast the production of renewable energies. Additionally, we define organizations of the market promoting collaborative learning which generate higher performance for the whole smart grid than full competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Hélène Le Cadre & Jean-Sébastien Bedo, 2012. "Distributed Learning in Hierarchical Networks," Post-Print hal-00740905, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00740905
    DOI: 10.4108/valuetools.2012.250217
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00740905v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
    2. H Peyton Young & Jason R. Marden and Lucy Y. Pao, 2011. "Achieving Pareto Optimality Through Distributed Learning," Economics Series Working Papers 557, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    3. Young, H. Peyton, 2004. "Strategic Learning and its Limits," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199269181.
    4. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "The Theory of Learning in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061945, April.
    5. Young, H. Peyton, 2009. "Learning by trial and error," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 626-643, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hélène Cadre & David Mercier, 2012. "Is energy storage an economic opportunity for the eco-neighborhood?," Netnomics, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 191-216, October.
    2. Hélène Le Cadre & David Mercier, 2013. "Is Energy Storage an Economic Opportunity for the Eco-Neighborhood?," Post-Print hal-00758916, HAL.
    3. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00758916 is not listed on IDEAS

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