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A New Approach to Firm Governance

Author

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  • Cécile Cézanne

    (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord (ancienne affiliation) - UP13 - Université Paris 13 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Over the last twenty years or so, the firm has changed considerably, especially with the growing importance of human capital. Paradoxically, the primacy of the shareholder value model has endured. The aim of this paper is to explore the main theoretical and empirical elements involved to propose a new model of firm governance. We view strategic employees of firms as critical resources because they represent specific human capital. We explain that the inalienable residual rights of control they have over their own human capital are inconsistent with disciplinary models of corporate governance. They rather call for the creation of an internal mode of regulation able to effectively mobilize specific human capital by motivating key employees. This model, which we call the ‘multi-resource model', is composite: we show that it aims to encourage, retain and collectively enrich critical resources by using an original operational system based on complementary instruments of incentive and coordination.

Suggested Citation

  • Cécile Cézanne, 2010. "A New Approach to Firm Governance," Post-Print hal-00523915, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00523915
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00523915v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean Tirole & Roland Bénabou, 2006. "Incentives and Prosocial Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1652-1678, December.
    2. Oliver Gottschalg & Maurizio Zollo, 2007. "Interest Alignment and Competitive Advantage," Post-Print hal-00459446, HAL.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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