IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/cesptp/halshs-00260863.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Measuring influence among players with an ordered set of possible actions

Author

Listed:
  • Michel Grabisch

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Agnieszka Rusinowska

    (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENS LSH - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

In the paper, we introduce and study generalized weighted influence indices of a coalition on a player, where players have an ordered set of possible actions. Each player has an inclination to choose one of the actions. Due to influence of a coalition of other players, a final decision of the player may be different from his original inclination. An influence in such situations is measured by the general weighted influence index. In a particular case, the decision of the player may be closer to the inclination of the influencing coalition than his inclination was. The weighted influence index which captures such a case is called the positive weighted influence index. We also consider the negative weighted influence index, where a final decision of the player goes farther away from the inclination of the influencing coalition. Some special cases of the weighted influence indices, called a possibility influence index and an equidistributed influence index, are also defined. We consider different influence functions and study their properties. A set of followers and a set of a conditional followers of a given coalition are defined, and their properties are analyzed. We define the concepts of success, decisiveness, luck, and failure for the multi-choice model of influence.

Suggested Citation

  • Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2008. "Measuring influence among players with an ordered set of possible actions," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00260863, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00260863
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00260863
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00260863/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2005. "Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 24(1), pages 171-197, January.
    2. Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2007. "The not-preference-based Hoede-Bakker index," Working Papers 0704, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    3. Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2007. "The not-preference-based Hoede-Bakker index," Post-Print halshs-00142482, HAL.
    4. Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2007. "The not-preference-based Hoede-Bakker index," Post-Print halshs-00142482, HAL.
    5. MoshÊ Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 1997. "Ternary Voting Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 26(3), pages 335-351.
    6. Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2007. "Influence Indices," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00142479, HAL.
      • Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2007. "Influence Indices," Post-Print halshs-00142479, HAL.
      • Agnieszka Rusinowska & Michel Grabisch, 2007. "Influence Indices," Working Papers 0705, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    7. Hsiao Chih-Ru & Raghavan T. E. S., 1993. "Shapley Value for Multichoice Cooperative Games, I," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 240-256, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2009. "Measuring influence in command games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(2), pages 177-209, August.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2010. "A model of influence with an ordered set of possible actions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(4), pages 635-656, October.
    2. Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2007. "Influence Indices," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00142479, HAL.
      • Agnieszka Rusinowska & Michel Grabisch, 2007. "Influence Indices," Working Papers 0705, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
      • Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2007. "Influence Indices," Post-Print halshs-00142479, HAL.
    3. Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2010. "A model of influence in a social network," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(1), pages 69-96, July.
    4. Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2010. "Different Approaches to Influence Based on Social Networks and Simple Games," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00514850, HAL.
    5. Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2010. "The Hoede-Bakker index modified to the Shapley-Shubik and Holler-Packel indices," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00406430, HAL.
    6. Tomas Rodriguez Barraquer, 2013. "From sets of equilibria to structures of interaction underlying binary games of strategic complements," Discussion Paper Series dp655, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    7. Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2007. "Modifying the Hoede-Bakker index to the Shapley-Shubik and Holler-Packel indices," Post-Print halshs-00205020, HAL.
    8. Grabisch, Michel & Rusinowska, Agnieszka, 2011. "Influence functions, followers and command games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 123-138, May.
    9. Grabisch, Michel & Rusinowska, Agnieszka, 2011. "A model of influence with a continuum of actions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 576-587.
    10. René van den Brink & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Frank Steffen, 2009. "Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: Dictator and Opinion Leader Properties," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 09-052/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    11. René Brink & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Frank Steffen, 2013. "Measuring power and satisfaction in societies with opinion leaders: an axiomatization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(3), pages 671-683, September.
    12. Alaitz Artabe & Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2012. "Preferences, actions and voting rules," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 15-28, March.
      • Artabe Echevarria, Alaitz & Laruelle, Annick & Valenciano Llovera, Federico, 2011. "Preferences, actions and voting rules," IKERLANAK info:eu-repo/grantAgreeme, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    13. Michel Grabisch, 2011. "Ensuring the boundedness of the core of games with restricted cooperation," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 191(1), pages 137-154, November.
    14. Christophe Labreuche & Michel Grabisch, 2008. "A value for bi-cooperative games," Post-Print halshs-00308738, HAL.
    15. Sébastien Courtin & Zéphirin Nganmeni & Bertrand Tchantcho, 2016. "The Shapley–Shubik power index for dichotomous multi-type games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(3), pages 413-426, September.
    16. Mustapha Ridaoui & Michel Grabisch & Christophe Labreuche, 2018. "An axiomatisation of the Banzhaf value and interaction index for multichoice games," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-02381119, HAL.
    17. Yukio Koriyama & Jean-François Laslier & Antonin Macé & Rafael Treibich, 2013. "Optimal Apportionment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 121(3), pages 584-608.
    18. Courtin, Sébastien & Nganmeni, Zéphirin & Tchantcho, Bertrand, 2017. "Dichotomous multi-type games with a coalition structure," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 9-17.
    19. Christophe Labreuche & Michel Grabisch, 2016. "A comparison of the GAI model and the Choquet integral with respect to a k-ary capacity," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01277825, HAL.
    20. Yukinori Iwata, 2022. "Ranking nomination rules on the basis of nominating power distributions," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 18(3), pages 382-401, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    decisiveness; follower of a coalition; influence function; influence indices; success;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00260863. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.