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Intertemporal Speculation , Shortages annd the Political Economy of Price Reform

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  • Van Wijnbergen, S.

Abstract

How should countries like Poland or the U.S.S.R. move toward price flexibility, gradually or in a "big bang"? Why is it that Governments committed to eventual price flexibility so often seem to be unable to let go of "temporary" controls? How can one explain that after price increases early in a program of price controls, one often sees output rise while at the same time shortages seem to increase also? This paper argues that intertemporal speculation, hoarding and the political economy of price reform go a long way toward explaining all these puzzles. The author shows that the interaction between shortages and political vulnerability of reformist governments so early perceptions of failure make for a strong argument against gradualism in the decontrol of prices. Copyright 1992 by Royal Economic Society.
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  • Van Wijnbergen, S., 1991. "Intertemporal Speculation , Shortages annd the Political Economy of Price Reform," Papers 9149, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:tilbur:9149
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    1. Alberto Alesina & Alex Cukierman, 1990. "The Politics of Ambiguity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 105(4), pages 829-850.
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    Cited by:

    1. Filippov, Mikhail G, 2002. "Russian Voting and the Initial Economic Shock of Hyperinflation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 111(1-2), pages 73-104, March.
    2. C. Martinelli & M. Tommasi, 1997. "Sequencing of Economic Reforms in the Presence of Political Constraints," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(2), pages 115-131, July.
    3. Goldberg, Linda S. & Karimov, Il'dar, 1997. "Black markets for currency, hoarding activity and policy reforms," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-4), pages 349-369, May.
    4. Funke, Norbert, 1993. "Timing and sequencing of reforms: Competing views," Kiel Working Papers 552, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    5. Sweder J. G. van Wijnbergen & Tim Willems, 2016. "Learning Dynamics and Support for Economic Reforms: Why Good News Can Be Bad," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 30(1), pages 1-23.
    6. Digdowiseiso, Kumba, 2010. "The transition of China and Ussr: A political economy perspective," MPRA Paper 22561, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Berkowitz, Daniel, 1996. "On the persistence of rationing following liberalization: A theory for economies in transition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(6), pages 1259-1279, June.
    8. Mehlum, Halvor, 2001. "Capital accumulation, unemployment, and self-fulfilling failure of economic reform," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 291-306, August.
    9. Diwan, Ishac & Saldanha, Fernando, 1991. "Long term prospects in Eastern Europe : the role of external finance in an era of change," Policy Research Working Paper Series 695, The World Bank.
    10. Ganimian, Alejandro J., 2016. "Why do some school-based management reforms survive while others are reversed? The cases of Honduras and Guatemala," International Journal of Educational Development, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 33-46.
    11. Almekinders, Geert J & Eijffinger, Sylvester C W, 1994. "Daily Bundesbank and Federal Reserve Interventions: Are They a Reaction to Changes in the Level and Volatility of the DM/$-Rate?," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 111-130.
    12. Gilles Saint-Paul, 2000. "The "New Political Economy": Recent Books by Allen Drazen and by Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(4), pages 915-925, December.
    13. Härdle, W.K. & Tsybakov, A.B., 1994. "How sensitive are average derivatives?," Other publications TiSEM 07ea66d2-29d5-4ec9-a59d-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    14. Cecilia Testa, 2005. "Reforms, lobbies and welfare: A common agency approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 305-337, December.
    15. Verbeek, M.J.C.M. & Nijman, T.E., 1994. "Minimum MSE estimation of a regression model with fixed effects from a series of cross-sections," Other publications TiSEM 702ff7bc-dfba-4834-8d71-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    16. Slobodan Djajić, 1999. "Shortages, Hoarding and Parallel‐Market Premia in an Economy with Administered Prices," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 1-10, February.
    17. Amihai Glazer, 2012. "Handicaps on Timing to Improve Reputation," Working Papers 111210, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    18. Mehlum, Halvor, 2002. "Zimbabwe: Investments, credibility and the dynamics following trade liberalization: on the investment response during trade reform," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 565-584, August.
    19. Hans J. Czap & Kanybek D. Nur-tegin, 2011. "Big Bang vs. Gradualism – A Productivity Analysis," EuroEconomica, Danubius University of Galati, issue 29, pages 38-56, August.
    20. Bera, A.K. & Lee, S., 1993. "Information matrix test, parameter heterogeneity and ARCH : A synthesis," Other publications TiSEM bf71e9fe-03a8-48f0-8a72-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    21. Bertocchi, Graziella & Spagat, Michael, 1997. "Structural uncertainty and subsidy removal for economies in transition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(9), pages 1709-1733, December.
    22. Mehlum, Halvor, 2001. "Speed of adjustment and self-fulfilling failure of economic reform," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 149-167, February.
    23. Cesar Martinelli, 2001. "Essays on Political Economy of Political Reform," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000135, David K. Levine.

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