On the Role of Public Opinion Polls in Political Competition
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- Tangerås, Thomas, 1998. "On the Role of Public Opinion Polls in Political Competition," Seminar Papers 655, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
ELECTIONS ; SOCIAL WELFARE ; PUBLIC OPINION;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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