Citizen Candidacy with Asymmetric Information
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Other versions of this item:
- Casamatta Georges & Sand-Zantman Wilfried, 2006. "Citizen Candidacy With Asymmetric Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-41, February.
- Sand-Zantman, Wilfried & Casamatta, Georges, 2003. "Citizen Candidacy with Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 3886, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinksi, 1995. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," Department of Economics Working Papers 1995-01, McMaster University.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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