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When do Representative and Direct Democracies Lead to Similar Policy Choices?

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  • Cukierman, A.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Spiegel, Y.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

Abstract

The paradigm of a direct democracy in which individuals vote direclty on the issues is widely used in the recent political economy literature that explicitly models the interaction between economic and political behavior. Yet, in most existing democracies policy decisions are delegated to elected officials. This begs the question of whether direct democracy models are useful for understanding actual policy choices. This question is also of independent interest since until the eighteenth century, the possibility that legislatures might consist of elected representatives remained mainly outside the theory and practice of democratic government. To answer this question we posit a model in which elected officials are better informed than the public about exogenous circumstances, but at the same time, are also influenced by particular constituencies whose desires policies generally differ from those of the decisive voter in the population.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Cukierman, A. & Spiegel, Y., 1998. "When do Representative and Direct Democracies Lead to Similar Policy Choices?," Discussion Paper 1998-115, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:22d4b6f6-e7f6-4407-8b91-832fea6e044f
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Otto H. Swank & Bauke Visser, 2002. "Delegation or Voting," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 02-005/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    2. Tangeras, T.P., 1998. "On the Role of Public Opinion Polls in Political Competition," Papers 655, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    democracy; voting; policy; uncertainty;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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